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December 8,1999

To the Auditing Standards Boards:
Enclosed are copies of the comment letters received to date on the Proposed Statement on
Auditing Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71,
Interim Financial Information.
To aide in your review, a summary of the comment letters by topic is also enclosed.

Please call me at 212/596-6026 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,

Kim Gibson
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213

Comment Letters
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards,
Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No, 61, Communication with Audi t Committees, and
Statemen t on Auditing Standards No, 71, Interim Financial Information

SAS No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees

Comment
Comment
Letter_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
4,16,18,26
Support the proposed amendment to SAS No. 61_________________________________________________________
2,5,7,13,17,21,
The requirement for the auditor to discuss the quality, not just the acceptability of the entity's accounting principles
25,27
should be removed.__________________________ _____________________________________________________
"25
Terms such as “clarity”, “neutrality” and “representational faithfulness” be deleted because they do not have a
recognized objective meaning_______________________________________________________________________
3,15,23
• The exclusive use of the terms taken from Concepts No. 2 may lose the flavor of the intention of the Panel and the
BRC.
• The discussion of "conservatism" in paragraph 96 of Concepts No. 2 is useful in this regard
• We believe this discussion of "conservatism" offers an opportunity to link the words in there commendations of the
BRC and the 1994 Panel with the accounting literature.

We believe that these terms, (aggressiveness or conservatism ) while not easily defined, are relatively easily
understood in financial circles and can serve as a useful benchmark for audit committee members. We would not
object to the inclusion of these concepts in the final standard.

We recommend that the wording in the amendments to SAS 61 revert to the “aggressive or conservative”, wording,
recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee.__________________________________________________________
1,3,5,12,15,19,
The requirement prohibiting the communication of the auditor's judgments in writing should be removed
21,22,24,29_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
29
The proposal does not distinguish quality from preferability. The ASB should ass a footnote explaining that quality
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does not carry the same meaning as preferability as the latter is used in APB No. 20.
The standard should clearly state that the auditor has a responsibility to communicate to the audit committee his/her
qualitative assessments of the company's financial reporting whether or not management chooses to play an active role
in the discussion.__________________________________________________________________________________
Discussions with non-SEC clients concerning the auditor’s judgements about the quality of the entity ’s accounting
principles would also be beneficial.___________________________________________________________________
The Exposure Draft assumes that management would be included as a participant. We do not believe that such
assumption should be included in the language of the amendment.___________________________________________
Clarify that auditors are not precluded from having this discussion privately with the audit committee._______________
We are concerned that the technical language used to describe the substance of the discussion (particularly the
references to representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality and consistency) may not be understandable to many
practitioners, and certainly not understandable to most audit committee members, who may look to this language to
help them frame their discussion with their auditors.______________________________________________________
Data in our study provide no evidence that discussions between the auditor and the audit committee about the quality
and appropriateness of earnings will mitigate against aggressive reporting_____________________________________
We recommend the communication of the "quality, not just the acceptability, of the company's accounting principles"
be integrated with the existing communication requirements regarding accounting policies and estimates rather than
added as a new item in the list_______________________________________________________________________
The discussion contemplated by the amendments to SAS 61 would be appropriate as part of the annual communication
with the audit committee of matters related to the conduct of the audit, but we do not believe it would be appropriate as
part of a discussion resulting from a quarterly review._____________________________________________________
A sentence should be added instructing the auditor to carefully review any minutes or other writings resulting from the
meeting prepared by the audit committee or management to ensure that the writings are consistent with the auditors'
understanding of what was communicated._____________________________________________________________
AU 380 requires discussion with audit committees concerning the selection of accounting policies, estimates and
judgements. It is unclear whether the ASB had something different in mind by repeating these aspects of the required
communication.
The proposal discussed the consistency of the entity's accounting information contained in the financial statements
twice.___________________________________________________________________________________________

Comment
________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supports proposed revisions_________________________________________________________________________
Time restrictive requirement. More restrictive for a review than is currently required with a GAAS audit.

SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information

Comment
Letter
3,7,18
2,4,8,9,13

Time schedules and deadlines make this recommendation impractical to implement and could result in needless delays
in the financial reporting process.

Such discussions should not be required prior to the filing of Form 10-Q, or prior to public announcement of interim
financial information______________________________________________________________________________
5,10,15,16,25,
Discussions prior to public announcement should not be required.
26,28__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
11
He or she should attempt to make such communications with the audit committe e... ” Use of the word “attempt,”
without providing guidance as to what would satisfy an “attempt”, appears to weaken this amendment and make
determinations of compliance difficult.
""12
The word "attempt" may place too much of a burden upon the auditor particularly when the tinting of the release of the
information may be affected. Accordingly, we suggest that the auditor's role under these circumstances should be
limited to an offer or indication of availability to make such communication
13,14,17
Such discussion should take place when matters of significance arise, but should not be required in the absence of such
matters._________________________________________________________________________________________
2
If an entity has an audit committee, the potential communication should apply, whether public or private company.
5
.. .there should be no implication that all publicly traded companies should be subject to quarterly reviews of interim
financial statements, regardless of size, industry or state of development.______________________________________
5,21,25
.. .deletion of the requirement to discuss the "quality" of accounting principles_________________________________
20
Our study indicates that earlier auditor involvement in a client firm's decisions about accounting methods likely will
mitigate against aggressive financial reporting. Specifically, we find that experienced auditors are less likely to deem a
client’s aggressive accounting method to be acceptable when the auditor is involved in management's decision making
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before, rather than after, quarterly statements have been released to the public and filed with the SEC._______________
It is unclear whether the matters to be communicated pursuant to the revised paragraph 25 would include the “quality”
of an entity ’s accounting principles as contemplated by the proposed revisions to SAS No. 61. Consequently, TIC
recommends that this issue be clarified.________________________________________________________________
Amendments to SAS 71, as they relate to the importance of the timing of the discussion between the auditor and the
audit committee, revert to the stated approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee, that is that the matter be
discussed "...prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any public announcement of financial
results)..."____________________________________________
Situations may arise wherein the audit committee may believe it unnecessary to have discussions with the accountant
upon completion of the review. In those circumstances, we believe the accountant should cover those matters when
making the communications specified by paragraph 6 through 16 of AU Section 380 (as amended) incidental to the
annual audit. We recommend the addition to the proposed standard of guidance to that effect._____________________
Clarification is needed with respect to the specific matters described in AU Section 380 that should be communicated
to the audit committee arising out of a review of interim information. Certain of the matters discussed in AU Section
380, such as the auditors’ responsibility under GAAS and difficulties encountered in performing the audit are not
applicable to reviews of quarterly information. In addition, the accountant’s responsibility for other information in
documents containing interim information is addressed in AU Sections 722.33 and 550. Accordingly, we recommend
that the proposed standard state that, to the extent applicable, the matters described in paragraphs 7 through 10,13 and
14 of SAS No. 61 (as amended and renumbered by SAS No. 89 and Part 1 of this proposed standard) should be
communicated to the audit committee as a result of the accountant having performed a review of interim financial
information______________________________________________________________________________________
Explicitly acknowledge, as AU Section 380 does, that the communication may be written or oral, and if oral, that the
accountant document the matters discussed by memorandum or other notation in the working papers._______________
The proposed standard should be issued only after analysis of the additional effects on AU Section 722, if any, of the
SEC’s final requirements for timely review of interim financial information.___________________________________
The effective date for this part of the proposed standard be for interim periods in fiscal years beginning on or after June
15, 2000. However, we would not object to permitting earlier application, including mid-year adoption during
calendar year 2000.________________________________________________________________________________
we recommend that the proposed effectiveness of the new requirements be extended one year_____________________
Require this communication with the audit committees prior to the filing of the annual financial statements and prior to

the public release of the annual results.

AICPA

December 9, 1999
File Ref. Nos. 1120
2280
To the Auditing Standards Board:
Here are the comment letters received to date on the proposed Statement on Auditing
Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication
with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial
Information.
Name/Affiliation

Location

1. Peter H. Burgher

Howell, MI

2. Greg Swalwell

Dallas, TX

3. Charles A. Bowsher, Chairman
Public Oversight Board

Stamford, CT

4. Michael L. Conley
McDonald’s

Oak Brook, IL

5. Richard H. Troy
Cell Pathways, Inc.

Horsham, PA

6. Kevin Wilson

Tivoli, NY

7. Mark Wovsaniker
America Online Incorporated

Dulles, VA

8. Jay R. Lundborg
First Midwest

Itasca, IL

9. Paul Jones
American Home Products Corporation

Madison, NJ

10. Andy Bryant
Intel Corporation

Santa Clara, CA

11. William G. Bishop III, CIA
Institute of Internal Auditors

Altamonte Springs, FL

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 • (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213 • www.aicpa.org

ISO9001 Certified

Name/Affiliation

Location

12. Richard Rowe
American Bar Association

Chicago, IL

13. Mr. R. L. Polark
Walgreens

Deerfield, IL

14. Scott A. Scherff
The Timken Company

Canton, OH

15. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP

Florham Park, NJ

16. Donald D. Humphreys
Exxon Corporation

Irving, TX

17. Steven E. Howarth
Black & Decker Corporation

Towson, MD

18. Dr. Douglas E. Ziegenfuss
Virginia Society
of Certified Public Accountants

Virginia Beach, VA

19. Lawrence P. Brown

Chicago, IL

20. Kathryn Kadous
University of Washington

Seattle, WA

21. Candace Wright
PCPS Technical Issues Committee

Baton Rouge, LA

22. Vincent Love
New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants

New York, NY

23 Ernst & Young LLP

Cleveland, OH

24 Deloitte & Touche LLP

Wilton, CT

25. Guy Lander
New York State Bar Association

Albany, NY

26. Donald E. Kiernan
SBC Communications Inc.

San Antonio, TX
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Name/Affiliation

Location

27. Joy L. Gibson, CPA
Florida Institute of
Certified Public Accountants

Tallahassee, FL

28. M. R. Kitten
Chevron Corporation

San Francisco, CA

29 Arthur Andersen

Chicago, IL

OTHERS
Name/Affiliation

Location

1. Meritor Automotive, Inc.
Thomas Madden

Troy, MI

2. Charles H. Harff
Meritor Automotive, Inc.

Troy, MI

3. Richard E. Staedtler
Castle Energy Corporation

Radnor, PA

If you have any questions, please call me at 212/596-6026.

Sincerely,

Kim Gibson
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
Enclosures
cc: Audit Committee Effectiveness Task Force
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#1
PETER H. BURGHER
2 Brambleberry Dr.
Howell, Ml 48843
517 546-3799

November 3, 1999

AICPA
Audit and Attest Standards
Attn: Sherry Boothe
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036

Gentlemen:
With reference to proposed amendments to SAS No. 71, Part 1 there must be a
misprint or some other form of error in the sentence that states (within paragraph 11) “the
auditors’ judgements shall not be communicated in writing”.

In our society written expression always takes precedence over oral expression,
witness the severe limitations in the rules governing parol evidence. It would be sheer
lunacy to require that auditors, whose communications should always be made with
clarity and precision, to communicate solely by oral means. It is hard to imagine the
levels of misunderstanding that could be achieved by lay audit committee members when
confronted with easily forgotten and possibly imprecise discussions by highly technical
experts attempting to explain broad intangibles and qualitative judgements.
I urge the committee to correct this error at its earliest possible convenience lest
the entire financial community think the profession has, even temporarily, lost its
collective mind. Written expression should be required with the license given that
auditors are encouraged to amplify, interpret and explain their judgements in person by
discussion and examples.

The subject matter of the proposed revisions is serious business and will be
difficult to implement. While auditor’s professional activities have always relied upon
high levels ofjudgement based on education, training and experience, the explanation of

PETER H. BURGHER

AICPA
Audit and Attest Standards
Page Two

such highly intangible concepts as judgements concerning “quality” of management’s
judgements as disclosed by accounting practices, theories and procedures will be difficult
at best. It would be wise to ensure the communications by auditors are always clearly
documented and that a record is maintained.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely.

Peter H. Burgher, CPA
AICPA No. 109670
phb:ed

COMMENT LETTER # 2

7915 Xavier Court
Dallas, Texas 75218-4513
November 9, 1999

VTA EMAIL - sboothe@aicpa.org

Sherry Boothe
AICPA Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:

I am writing to give my comments on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards Amendments to
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 and 71.
SAS No. 61

I object to the proposed amendment to SAS No. 61 to require the auditor to discuss with the audit committee
the auditor's judgment about the "quality" of an entity's accounting principles as applied in its financial
reporting.
The Auditing Standards Board correctly acknowledges that no objective criteria have been established to aid
in the consistent evaluation of the "quality" of an entity's accounting measurements and disclosures. Without
such objective criteria, any such discussion would be highly subjective and potentially confusing and
misleading. For example, there is no guidance as to how such a discussion of "quality" relates to the
auditor's attestation with respect to the fair presentation of an entity's financial statements in accordance with
GAAP. Does the Auditing Standards Board envision that the auditor will express an opinion to the audit
committee that the entity's financial statements are presented more or less "fair" than other entities' financial
statements by reference to a discussion of the undefined term "quality?" Is the Auditing Standards Board
stating that there are acceptable differences in the degree of the "quality" of a set of GAAP financial
statements, taken as a whole? Wouldn't shareholders and other users of GAAP financial statements have a
right to know the auditor's views about these differences in degree of "quality?"

The Auditing Standards Board showed its reservations to the proposed requirement by prohibiting such
communications to the audit committee from being in writing. If the Auditing Standards Board is so
uncomfortable with its proposal so as to prohibit such communications to the audit committee from being in
writing, then such communications should not be required in the first place.

I believe the proposed communication requirement should only be adopted after objective criteria are
sufficiently established which will allow for consistency in the evaluation of "quality." Accordingly, because
such criteria do not presently exist, I do not support the proposed amendment to SAS No. 61 at this time.
SAS No.

71

The proposed new section AU 722.26 is confusing with respect to the timing of the potential communication
to the audit committee if the entity makes a public announcement of its interim financial information prior to
making a filing with the regulatory agency (e.g. an entity issues a press release announcing its interim results
before filing its Form 10-Q with the SEC). In that case, the proposed amendment states that the auditor
should attempt to make such communication prior to the public announcement of the interim financial
information. For that to occur, the auditor would have to complete their SAS 71 review prior to such public
announcement, and therefore the proposed AU 722.26 could be construed to contain such a timing
requirement. This may not always be practical from a timing standpoint.
The ASB correctly acknowledges that the Blue Ribbon Committee's proposal to require the auditor to
complete a SAS 71 review of the interim financial statements prior to filing with the SEC is a matter to be
taken up by the SEC. The requirements of when such a review should be performed should also be left up to
the SEC.

AU 380.04 states that the required communication with the audit committee is incidental to the audit and is
not required to occur before issuance of the auditor's report on the financial statements. AU 380.04 does
state that there may be instances where such communication should occur prior to the issuance of the audit
report, and those instances are left up to the auditor's judgment. I see no logical reason to require a more
time-restrictive requirement for the timing of the communication to the audit committee following a non
audit, SAS 71 review, as is currently reflected in the proposed amendment to AU 722, than is currently
required with a GAAS audit per AU 380.

Also, regardless of whether or not the SAS 71 review is performed on an entity making periodic filings with
the SEC or other regulatory agency, the potential communication to the audit committee should be required.
The required communications contained in AU 380 are applicable to SEC registrants and non-SEC
registrants who have an audit committee or similar functioning body (AU 380.01). Therefore, I see no need
for a different scope requirement in AU 722. If a review is performed, and the entity has an audit committee
or similar body, the potential communication should occur.

Accordingly, I recommend that the proposed section AU 722.26 not be adopted, and that AU 722.25 be re
written in its entirety as follows:
"In performing the procedures in paragraphs .13 through .19, the accountant also should consider whether
any of the matters described in AU 380, Communications With Audit Committees, as they relate to the
interim financial information, have been identified. If such matters have been identified, the accountant
should communicate them to the audit committee or be satisfied, through discussions with the audit
committee, that such matters have been communicated with the audit committee by management. For
instance, the accountant should determine that the audit committee is informed about the process used by
management in formulating particularly sensitive accounting estimates or about a change in a significant
accounting policy affecting the interim results. Such communication with the audit committee is incidental
to the performance of the procedures in paragraphs .13 through .19. Accordingly, they are not required to
occur before issuance of the accountant's review report, as discussed elsewhere in this section, so long as
they occur on a timely basis. There may be occasions, however, where communication of certain matters
with the audit committee prior to issuance of the accountant's review report may, in the accountant's
judgment, be desirable.
Thank you for your consideration to my comments.

Sincerely,

/s/ Greg Swalwell
Greg Swalwell - AICPA Member # 1-01104439
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PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
One Station Place
Stamford, CT 06902

(203) 353-5300
Fax (203) 353-5311

Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards
Amendments to
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication with Audit Committees,
and
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information
Comment Letter
BOARD
CHARLES A. BOWSHER
Chairman

DONALD J. KIRK
Vice Chairman
ROBERT F. FROEHLKE
MELVIN R. LAIRD

A. A. SOMMER, JR

STAFF
JERRY D. SULLIVAN
Executive Director

CHARLES J. EVERS
Technical Director
JOHN F. CULLEN
Assistant Technical Director

ALAN H. FELDMAN
Assistant Technical Director

November 12, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
American Institute of CPAs
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: ITC 99-1
Dear Ms. Boothe:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards,
Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication with Audit
Committees (“SAS No. 61”), and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial
Information (“SAS No. 71 ”), issued by the AICPA Auditing Standards Board on October 1,
1999.

The Board fully supports the proposed revision of SAS No. 71 concerning communications
with audit committees relating to review of interim financial information. Therefore, the
following comments relate to the proposed amendments to SAS No. 61.

As you know, the Public Oversight Board in March 1994 formed a special Panel to inquire
into matters relating to auditor objectivity and independence. That Panel, which was chaired
by our current Vice-Chairman, Donald J. Kirk, recommended a number of steps to enhance
the integrity of financial reporting through strengthening the communication between a
company’s independent auditor and its board of directors and audit committee. These steps
were fully embraced by our Board.

Included among the recommendations in the Panel’s report, Strengthening the Professionalism
of the Independent Auditor, which was issued in September 1994 was a recommendation to
enhance auditor communication to audit committees of qualitative judgments about
accounting principles, disclosures and estimates. The Panel encouraged auditors to timely
communicate with boards and their audit committees about (1) the auditors’ qualitative
judgments about accounting principles used or proposed by management, not just whether or
not those principles are acceptable, (2) the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism implied
in the company’s accounting principles and underlying estimates, and (3) the clarity of
financial disclosures.

POB

The Public Oversight Board is an independent, private sector body that monitors and
reports on the self-regulatory programs and activities of the SEC Practice Section of the
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
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The Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees included among its ten recommendations that
Panel recommendation. The BRC recommended that generally accepted auditing standards
require such communication and that the requirement be written in a way “to encourage open,
frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate.”
The Board fully endorses the BRC’s recommendation in that respect and the Auditing
Standards Board’s efforts to establish a standard that will lead auditors to provide these
qualitative and subjective communications to corporate boards and their audit committees in a
meaningful fashion. We have significant reservations in three areas concerning the proposed
revision of SAS No. 61:
1. The guidance is inadequate to achieve a meaningful communication about quality,
2. The workpaper documentation requirement is incomplete, and
3. The blanket prohibition of auditors communicating their qualitative judgments to audit
committees in writing, while well-intentioned, may be unnecessary.
Qualitative Judgments to be Communicated
The POB recognizes the difficulty of writing a standard that will lend itself to consistent
communications to audit committees about qualitative assessments of income and
asset/liability measures and financial reporting disclosures that are inherently subjective in
nature. The Auditing Standards Board (“ASB”), in response to a charge that it do so, chose to
use terms in its guidance drawn from FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative
Characteristics ofAccounting Information, —“representational faithfulness,” “verifiability,”
“neutrality,” and “consistency”—rather than what the ASB describes as subjective
determinations of “degrees of aggressiveness or conservatism.” The exclusive use of the terms
taken from Concepts No. 2 may lose the flavor of the intention of the Panel and the BRC.
Earnings-management concerns rightfully focus on both ends of the spectrum in the
application of acceptable reporting principles and practices. The ideal—high quality financial
reporting—is the result of the application of those principles and practices by an unbiased
preparer. Deviations from the ideal are what both the BRC and the POB’s Panel believe
should be forthrightly and candidly brought to the attention of audit committees. Competent
auditors can recognize deviations, whether caused by lack of knowledge or by purposeful bias.

We urge the ASB to keep the message for the audit committee clear and understandable. The
discussion of "conservatism" in paragraph 96 of Concepts No. 2 is useful in this regard:
The Board emphasizes that any attempt to understate results consistently is
likely to raise questions about the reliability and the integrity of information
about those results and will probably be self-defeating in the long run. That
kind of reporting, however well intentioned, is inconsistent with the desirable
characteristics described in this Statement. On the other hand, the Board also
emphasizes that imprudent reporting, such as may be reflected, for example,
in overly optimistic estimates of realization, is certainly no less inconsistent
with those characteristics. Bias in estimating components of earnings,
whether overly conservative or unconservative, usually influences the
timing of earnings or losses rather than their aggregate amount. As a
result, unjustified excesses in either direction may mislead one group of
investors to the possible benefit or detriment of others. (Emphasis added)

We believe this discussion of "conservatism" offers an opportunity to link the words in the
recommendations of the BRC and the 1994 Panel with the accounting literature.
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Aggressiveness can be defined as synonymous with unconservative for purposes of SAS No.
61. Our Board members who have considerable experience in serving on audit committees are
confident that audit committee members will understand the message delivered by auditors if
they identify practices that are bordering on or moving toward being overly conservative or
overly aggressive. This “early warning” should enable an audit committee to better
understand the quality of a company’s financial reporting. A communication couched solely
or extensively in the terms selected from Concepts No. 2 (i.e., “representational faithfulness,”
“verifiability,” “neutrality,” and “consistency”) is not likely to be an effective way to
communicate with audit committees.
Michael R. Young, partner of Willkie Farr & Gallagher and editor of the manuscript entitled
Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud, reaches a similar conclusion in the chapter he
authored. In describing information that audit committees should obtain from outside
auditors, Young would want the question asked: “Is management overly aggressive? Overly
conservative?” In addition, he urges audit committees to discuss with the outside auditor the
topic of managerial bias in the application of generally accepted accounting principles and to
become satisfied that transactions and adjustments are “the natural consequence of business
activity and not the manifestation of a desire to attain preestablished financial reporting
targets.”
Documentation and Written Communication
The Board finds the last two sentences in paragraph 11 flawed. The last sentence states:
“.. .the auditor needs only document in the working papers that the discussion had taken place,
the date of the discussion, and the participants.”

The recommended working paper documentation needs to be expanded to include a
description of the matters discussed and views expressed. We believe that the working paper
documentation of those matters should have a positive behavioral impact on the auditor,
namely, it should lead the auditor to have the intended candid discussion with the audit
committee about all matters significant to an evaluation of the quality of financial reporting.
Also without that change, the spirit of the revised standard will be impossible to peer review.
We agree with the reasoning expressed in the article co-authored by Art Siegel, then chairman
of the SECPS Executive Committee, and Don Kirk in the Journal of Accountancy, January
1996, page 57: “In the event of litigation, the fact that some might believe that there are
“better” practices will be apparent to plaintiffs from their own evaluations, and it should be
helpful to the defense to have a record of thoughtful consideration of those alternatives before
the financial statements were issued ”

The second to last sentence in paragraph 11 states, “...the auditor’s judgments should not be
communicated in writing.” We recognize the purpose of this prohibition is to help achieve
open, frank discussion and avoid boilerplate communications. However, the blanket
prohibition is too restrictive. We can, for example, imagine circumstances where following
the discussion an audit committee might want a memorandum from the auditor describing the
matters discussed and the views expressed. In circumstances such as that, refusing to comply
would serve no useful purpose.
In order to encourage open, frank discussion, avoid boilerplate and, at the same time, not
prohibit all written communications, the standard might express a preference, such as: “In
order to encourage open, frank discussion and avoid boilerplate reporting, it is preferable that
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any written communication by the auditor expressing views on the quality of financial
reporting follow discussion of those matters with the audit committee.”
Auditor Responsibility to Communicate
The summary of the proposed statement indicates that the effectiveness of the proposal is
dependent on the willingness of all parties to engage in the discussion and act on the
implications. The preamble to the proposal notes among other things that the proposed
statement encourages a three-way discussion among the auditor, management, and the audit
committee and that management should play an active part in the discussion. The Board urges
that the standard should clearly state that the auditor has a responsibility to communicate to
the audit committee his/her qualitative assessments of the company’s financial reporting
whether or not management chooses to play an active role in the discussion.

We appreciate the efforts of the Auditing Standards Board to establish reasonable standards
for auditor communications with audit committees. If you have questions concerning our
comments, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Charles A. Bowsher
Chairman
cc: Panel on Audit Effectiveness

McDonald's Corporation
McDonald's Plaza
Oak Brook. Illinois 60523-1900

Donald's

Direct Dial Number

November 22, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

File No. 2280

Dear Ms. Boothe:

McDonald’s Corporation appreciates the role of the Auditing Standards Board in proposing amendments
to SAS No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees, and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information,
in response to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees.
We clearly support the overall goal of improving the effectiveness of audit committees. We support the
Board's proposed amendment to SAS No. 61 requiring auditors to discuss with the audit committee the
auditor's judgment about the quality, not just the acceptability of a company's accounting principles as
applied in its financial statements. However, we disagree with the proposed amendment to SAS No. 71.

While we believe that open meaningful dialogue among management, the outside auditors and the audit
committee is vital to an audit committee's effectiveness, we do not believe that the auditor should be
required to attempt to communicate with a company's audit committee, or at least its chairman, every
quarter prior to the release of interim financial information or prior to the company filing interim financial
information with the SEC. Time schedules and deadlines make this recommendation impractical to
implement and could result in needless delays in the financial reporting process.
As a more feasible alternative, we recommend that the necessity of such a discussion be left to the
judgment of the company’s financial management and its outside auditor depending upon individual
circumstances (e.g., if there were significant judgments or adjustments impacting the results of the current
quarter, such a discussion may be warranted). We believe that this approach would be more practical and
more cost effective than a blanket rule requiring a fixed number of discussions each year. It would also
help ensure that communications with audit committees are meaningful and useful to the company and its
audit committee rather than merely being a statutory requirement. Since the outside auditor has
unrestricted access to the audit committee, we believe that the combination of regularly scheduled
meetings (that don’t need to coincide with quarterly earnings releases) and additional discussions when
circumstances dictate ensures that all appropriate communication is taking place on a timely basis.

We appreciate your consideration of our comments and would be happy to discuss this topic with you in
further detail. If you have any questions or comments and would like to discuss them further, please call
me at (630) 623-3250.
Sincerely,

Michael L. Conley
Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer
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Horsham, PA 19044 USA
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Cell Pathways, Inc.
November 22, 1999

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attention:
Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards

Re:

Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 71, Interim Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280

Ladies and Gentlemen:
Cell Pathways, Inc. is pleased to provide comments to the AICPA on its proposed
amendments to SAS 61 and SAS 71 (the “Proposal” or "Proposals").

The comments of this letter may reflect the concerns of the hundreds of small publicly
traded companies which do not have product sales or earnings and would not normally engage in
auditor review of interim financial statements or discussions with audit committees at the time of
interim financial statements.
This letter supports some of the proposals, but not all. In particular, we feel that there
should be no implication that all publicly traded companies should be subject to quarterly
reviews of interim financial statements, regardless of size, industry or state of development. On
the contrary, such reviews should not be conducted where there is no purpose to be accomplished
by the review. Many publicly traded companies lack sufficient economic substance to merit such
reviews. Enclosed for your convenience is a copy of our comment letter to the Securities and
Exchange Commission on their related proposals.

The Commenting Company
Cell Pathways was founded ten years ago to develop pharmaceutical agents to prevent
cancer. It may be the only public company founded for this purpose. Its programs have since
expanded to include cancer therapy, as well. It has no sales, no earnings. Some day we hope it
will. It has about 60 employees. It formed an audit committee of outside directors about two
years before becoming a public company. The development stage of the business does not merit
either auditor review or audit committee review of earnings statements on a quarterly basis.

SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.

This proposal would add a requirement that auditors discuss with the audit committee the
following matters concerning the auditors’judgments about the quality (not just the acceptability)
of the company’s accounting principles:

a.
b.

c.

consistency of application of accounting policies
clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information
contained in the financial statements and related disclosures
items that have a significant impact on the representational faithfulness,
verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of the accounting information
included in the financial statements, including, for example:

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

selection of new or changes to accounting policies
estimates, judgments and uncertainties
unusual transactions
accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items,
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they
are recorded

The auditors would be not be permitted to communicate the above matters in writing to the audit
committee (documentation of the discussion would appear in the audit work papers).

We do not oppose additional specificity about items to be discussed by the auditors with
the audit committee, provided that the items have a basis in established standards as recognized
in current accounting literature. This would mean that it would be acceptable to add specificity
with respect to: consistency of application of accounting policies; consistency and completeness
of accounting information; and verifiability and consistency of accounting information with
respect to such matters as selection of new (or changes to) accounting policies, estimates,
judgments and uncertainties, unusual transactions, and accounting policies relating to
significant financial statement items (including the timing of transactions and the period in which
they are recorded).
We do feel, however, that AICPA should not include the requirement to discuss the
“quality” (not just the acceptability) of the company’s accounting principles. Auditors and audit
committees may get into this area if they choose to; but it should not become mandatory.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard for
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards and financial statement reporting. We should not
introduce a foreign concept with no clearly and definitively established interpretation. The
AICPA Proposal recognizes that there are no objective criteria for “quality.” Because of the lack
of criteria, the Proposal prohibits the auditor from communicating its judgments about “quality”
in writing. In short, there no sound basis upon which to subject companies and their audit
committees to a requirement to discuss a non-standard standard for financial statements, or to
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possibly become liable under such non-standard standards, or to become liable for discussing
such non-standard standards. If adopted, this part of the Proposal would expand the bases of
potential litigation and liability, and, to a corresponding extent, discourage qualified individuals
from becoming entangled in the activities of audit committees.

We recommend that the words “the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the
acceptability, of’ be deleted from proposed subsection .11 of SAS 61 (AU sec. 380.11).

Also, we are concerned about the meaning of the term “representational faithfulness” and
we suggest that it be deleted unless univocal clarity of meaning can be established.

In the same vein, the words “clarity” and “neutrality” seem neither clear nor neutral; they
lack established meaning which can be determined by objective criteria; they should be omitted.

If the above amendment is accomplished, then the last three sentences of proposed
subsection .11, dealing with the lack of objective criteria and the prohibition on written
communications would not be required.
Importantly, the text should make clear that these procedures apply only: (a) to such
interim reviews as are actually conducted, and (b) to the extent that the company has and utilizes
an audit committee. These procedures should not be misconstrued as requiring that there be
interim reviews of quarterly financial statements (which would be beyond the purview of AICPA
and of statements of either accounting or auditing principle), or that companies either have or use
audit committees (which also would be beyond the purview of AICPA and statements of either
accounting or auditing principle). Where interim reviews are, in fact, conducted, but a company
does not have an audit committee, the proposal should make provision for discussion with the
board of directors or other senior body of the company.

Finally, the proposal should make it clear that the discussion with the audit committee (or
other senior body of the company) should be preceded by similar discussion with those in the
company responsible for accounting, internal audit and other aspects of the financial control
apparatus of the company.

SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.

The Proposal would amend SAS 71 to require the auditors to have the SAS 61
discussions (presently required only for annual audits) in connection with a review of interim
financials. In particular, the auditor would have to communicate to the audit committee, or be
satisfied through discussions with the audit committee that management communicated to the
committee, matters described in SAS 61 that have been identified in the conduct of the interim
financial review.

We think it is a good idea that there be a discussion of SAS 61 information that has been
identified related to interim financial statements, but only if the content and extent of the SAS 61
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information does not go beyond the current Proposal as changed as discussed above, including
deletion of the requirement to discuss the “quality” of accounting principles.

For those companies whose auditors do not currently conduct SAS 61-type reviews with
respect to interim financial statements, the requirement would add additional cost and delays in
release of interim financial statements. Thus, as discussed above, care should be taken to avoid
any implication that interim reviews of quarterly financial statements are mandatory.
A further aspect of the Proposal is that, where an interim review is performed, the
auditors would be required to attempt to discuss the SAS 61 matters with the audit committee or
at least the committee chairperson, and a representative of financial management, prior to the
filing of the Form 10-Q and, if possible, prior to a public announcement of interim financial
results. We are not in disagreement with the principles that, where an interim review is, in fact,
performed, the independent auditor have timely access to the audit committee, or at least the
chair of the committee, and company financial management to discuss SAS 61 matters identified
with respect to interim financial statements prior to filing the Form 10-Q. We have deep
reservations, however, with the proposed amendment to SAS 71, particularly as it applies to
public announcements of interim results.
While it is preferable to have the audit committee discussions, if they are to occur, prior
to release of earnings, it may not be practicable to achieve this. We are informed that many
companies have not actually completed their financial statements by the time they announce
earnings. The physically disparate location of audit committee members poses another practical
problem. Retroactive discussion loses much of its purpose and creates the dilemma of whether to
create a record of second-guessing the already-released earnings.

Hence, where interim reviews are undertaken, the matter of discussions prior to public
announcement should be modified to be a recommended best practice. SAS 61 should make
clear: that companies are not required to delay the timing of their earnings releases; and that
companies are not required to take on additional burdens in order to have the discussion with the
audit committee (or member) prior to the release of earnings.

Again, as above, the text should make clear that the proposed procedures as to auditor
discussion with the audit committee apply only: (a) to such interim reviews as are actually
conducted, and (b) to the extent that the company has and utilizes an audit committee. These
procedures should not be misconstrued as requiring that there be interim reviews of quarterly
financial statements (which would be beyond the purview of AICPA and of statements of either
accounting or auditing principal), or that companies either have or use audit committees (which
also would be beyond the purview of AICPA and or statements of either accounting or auditing
principle). Where interim reviews are conducted but a company does not have an audit
committee, the proposal should make provision for discussion with the board of directors or
other senior body of the company.
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We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Proposals and would be pleased to
answer any questions you may have. You may reach me at 215-706-3840.

Richard H. Troy
Senior Vice President, Corporate Development
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#7
AMERICA ONLINE
INCORPORATED

November 23, 1999

Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

RE: Exposure Draft - Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No.71

Dear Ms. Boothe:
We support the AICPA Auditing Standards Board’s effort to propose rule changes amending SAS No. 61,
Communication with Audit Committees, and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information. We understand
that these changes are in response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. However, we respectfully offer the following views
regarding each of the proposals.

Proposed Amendment to SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information
We support this proposal to require the auditors to communicate to the audit committee or be satisfied,
through discussions with the audit committee, that matters described in SAS No. 61 have been
communicated to the audit committee by the management of the company when such matters have been
identified in the conduct of interim financial reporting and prior to a public announcement of interim
information, or as soon as practicable thereafter.
Proposed Amendment to SAS No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees

We do not support the proposal to require the auditor to discuss certain information relating to the auditor’s
judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles with the
audit committees of SEC clients. It appears to us that either the financial statements are or are not in
conformity with GAAP. Accordingly, the discussion regarding the quality of the company’s accounting
principles would not provide any additional benefits. Any discussions on the thinking behind choices from
allowable alternatives, particular company or industry considerations, clarity of presentation, and other
judgmental issues should be handled in the normal dialogue that occurs between management, the auditors
and the audit committee, which is currently required by SAS No. 61.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the AICPA Auditing Standards Board’s proposed
amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No.71. We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at
your convenience.

Sincerely,

Mark Wovsaniker
Vice President, Accounting Policy

22000AOL Way • Dulles, Virginia 20166-9323
http://www.aol.com/

#8
First Midwest

First Midwest Bancorp. Inc.
300 Park Blvd., Suite 405
P.O. Box 459
Itasca. Illinois 60143-9768
(630) 875-7450

November 24, 1999
Auditing Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center
201 Plaza Three
Jersey City, New Jersey 07311-3881

RE:

Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No. 71

Gentlemen:

The Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has proposed
amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards ("SAS") No. 61, Communications with Audit
Committees, and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information. The proposed amendments are based on
recommendations made earlier this year by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness
of Corporate Audit Committees.
Proposed amendments to SAS No. 71 would require discussions between independent auditors and the
audit committee of matters described in SAS No. 61. First Midwest Bancorp, Inc.("First Midwest") and
the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of First Midwest (the "Audit Committee") believe, that
such discussions should not be required prior to the filing ofForm 10-Q, or prior to public announcement
of interim financial information.

This requirement, if adopted, would impose additional and unnecessary burdens on audit committees,
would result in additional costs to First Midwest, and expose audit committee members to greater risk of
personal liability. We do not believe that having discussions with audit committees prior to the filing of
Form 10-Q will result in more reliable or credible interim financial statements - particularly where the
required quarterly reviews under SAS No. 61 reveal no significant adjustments, changes in estimates,
significant new accounting policies or disagreements with management. While First Midwest opposes the
adoption of specific rules regarding the timing of discussion between audit committees and the independent
auditors, any such requirement should be limited to situations where the attention ofthe audit committee
is warranted. To require such discussion in other situations is cost ineffective and counterproductive.
Questions regarding these comments may be directed to the undersigned at (630) 875-7458.

Very truly yours,

Jay R. Lundborg
Senior Vice President and
Audit Services Director
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AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION
FIVE GIRALDA FARMS, MADISON. NEW JERSEY 07940 (973) 660-5010. FAX (973) 660-7277

PAUL J. JONES

November 29, 1999

VICE PRESIDENT-COMPTROLLER

Mr. Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
U.S, Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20549

Subject: SEC PROPOSALS REGARDING AUDIT COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE

Dear Mr. Katz:
In response to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) release proposing new
requirements for corporate audit committees (the “Proposal”), enclosed are our comments for
your review and consideration. For the sake of clarity, we have included a brief outline of the
proposals along with our comments.

Pre-Filing Review of Quarterly Financial Statements

The Proposal would require that a company’s independent auditors perform a SAS No. 71
“Interim Financial Information” review of the financial information included in the
company’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q prior to the company filing such forms with
the SEC.
Procedures for a SAS No. 71 review of interim financial information consists principally of
applying analytical procedures to financial data and making inquiries of persons responsible for
financial and accounting matters. Accordingly, while such reviews could be performed without a
significant increase in costs, we do not believe they would have a significant impact on the
reliability of interim financial statements, the extent of year-end audit procedures, or result in
fewer restatements of interim financial statements. Further, we believe that the Blue Ribbon
Committee (“BRC”) recommendation to amend SAS No. 71 to require that the audit committee
discuss with the auditors certain matters including significant adjustments, management
judgments and accounting estimates, significant new accounting policies, and disagreements
with management prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q is even less desirable. Thus, we continue
to oppose this recommendation via copy of this letter to the Auditing Standards Board of the
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AICPA, The preparation and presentation of the annual and interim financial information is a
management responsibility and does not belong with the audit committee. The involvement and
review by the audit committee or its chairperson would be impractical prior to the filing of each
quarterly report on Form 10-Q. Moreover, it would not be unreasonable to anticipate that the
audit committee responsibilities with respect to the reports on Form 10-Q may eventually lead to
audit committee involvement prior to the public release of quarterly financial results, thus
imposing even greater burdens on these outside directors. Accordingly, we feel that the
responsibilities and time involved in these tasks may discourage qualified individuals from
participating on audit committees.

The Audit Committee Report
The Proposal would require that the audit committee provide a report in the company’s
proxy statement disclosing whether or not the audit committee has reviewed and discussed
the audited financial statements with management, discussed certain matters with the
independent auditors and received certain disclosures from the independent auditors, and
discussed the auditors’ independence with the auditors.
The Proposal would require the audit committee to also state in its report whether, based
on the review and discussions described above, anything came to the attention of the
members of the audit committee that caused the audit committee to believe that the audited
financial statements included in the company’s annual report contained an untrue
statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading. The disclosure would appear over the names of the audit committee members.

We do not believe that this requirement will provide any meaningful benefit from a shareholder’s
point of view, nor do we believe that it would reinforce the audit committee's awareness and
acceptance of its responsibilities. In our opinion, the existence of an audit committee implicitly
confirms that discussions with management and the auditors should be occurring without the
need for written disclosure. The audit committee has responsibility for selecting an external
auditor but it remains the external auditor’s role to perform the audit and to report on the annual
financial statements of the company. As stated in the Proposal, existing SEC rules require the
current annual report to shareholders to include a Report of Independent Public Accountants and
for the Annual Report on Form 10-K to be executed by a majority of the members of the board of
directors. Therefore, we believe there would be no benefit to including an additional
representation from the audit committee or by having their names appear under such a disclosure.
Audit Committee Charters

The Proposal would require companies to disclose in their proxy statements whether or not
the audit committee is governed by a charter. In addition, if the audit committee has a
charter, a copy of the charter would have to be included as an appendix to the proxy
statement at least once every three years. The Proposal would not require companies to
adopt audit committee charters, or dictate the content of the charter if one is adopted.
2
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Additionally, any statements about whether the audit committee has complied with the
charter are not required.
Although we consider the maintenance of an effective comprehensive audit committee charter to
be a prudent business practice, we believe that including the charter in the proxy statement to
shareholders every three years is unnecessary. We suggest that the charter be included as an
exhibit to the Annual Report on Form 10-K and that any significant changes be disclosed in the
proxy statement. The concern expressed in the Proposal regarding the risk of broadly worded
and vague committee charters to minimize committee members’ exposure is, in our view valid,
and can only be mitigated if the NYSE or SEC were to provide specific guidance as to the form
and content of a charter.

Disclosure Regarding the Independence ofAudit Committee Members
The Proposal would require companies to disclose in their proxy statements certain
information regarding any member of the audit committee who is not independent.

We agree with the SEC’s position on the importance of having an audit committee that is
comprised of independent directors, and believe that shareholders should be informed when an
audit committee director is not independent. Accordingly, we concur with the proxy disclosure
requirements, that upon the appointment of a non-independent director to the audit committee,
the nature of the relationship that makes that individual not independent and the reasons for the
board's determination should be disclosed.
Proposed Safe Harbors
The Proposal proposes to establish “safe harbors” pertaining to the information required
to be disclosed under the proposals in an effort to protect companies and their directors
from certain liabilities under the federal securities laws.

We agree with the proposal to adopt liability ‘‘safe harbors” to cover the new disclosure
requirements.
If you would like to discuss any of the above comments, please feel free to call me at
(973) 660-5010.
Very truly yours,

cc:

John R. Stafford
Robert G. Blount
Louis L. Hoynes, Jr.
Auditing Standards Board
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COMMENT LETTER #10

Intel Corporation

Intel
November 22, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61 Communication with Audit Committee and SAS
No. 71, Interim Financial Information

Dear Ms. Boothe:

Intel welcomes this opportunity to comment on the subject proposed amendments. We support
the clarifying guidance for content of discussions with the Audit Committee in SAS No. 61.
However we consider the proposal for accountant and audit committee communication prior to
a company’s public announcement of interim financial information in SAS 71 to be
unrealistic. This communication will delay the release of our financial results without adding
any commensurate value. The earnings release process at Intel involves numerous groups and
the document goes through many draft stages. The involvement of the audit committee would
neither improve the process nor establish useful oversight or control. Thus it is more likely
that such communication will transpire as soon as practicable after the public announcement.
Sincerely,

Andy Bryant
Senior Vice President
Chief Financial Officer

COMMENT LETTER #11

November 24, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) appreciates the opportunity to submit our comments to
the AICPA Auditing Standards Board’s (ASB) proposed amendments to Statements on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees, and SAS No. 71,
Interim Financial Information. The IIA is very supportive of the efforts the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC).

Although the ASB has chosen to limit application of the amendment of SAS No. 61 to SEC
clients, The IIA believes that discussions with non-SEC clients concerning the auditor’s
judgements about the quality of the entity’s accounting principles would also be beneficial.
Our concern is that non-public companies may also have significant stakeholders whose
interests are not protected by this limitation. These stakeholders could include pension and
other retirement plan participants, private investors, lenders, and others who rely on audited
financial statements.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) recently
published the study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997 An Analysis of U.S. Public
Companies (COSO Report). The COSO Report findings revealed that companies committing
fraud generally were small, and in most cases were not listed on the New York or American
Stock Exchanges. The COSO Report also found that audit committees and boards of these
companies were weak and rarely met. Some would argue based on these findings that one
could also conclude that non-public companies could be more susceptible to fraud due to the
lack of best practice reporting requirements such as those imposed by the SEC and ASB.
Although additional best practice requirements are needed for such companies, application of
the amendment of SAS No. 61 to all clients would be a step in the right direction that COSO’s
“tone-at-the-top” philosophy supports.

We also suggest that the auditor document not only that the discussion has taken place, date of
the discussion, and the participants, but also the specific topics or items discussed. While an
auditor’s judgement may be prone to subjective evaluations in the absence of objective criteria,
a listing of the specific topics discussed will facilitate future discussions and work related to
the items discussed. Such a list can be compiled without documenting the auditor’s
judgements.

In the amendment to SAS No. 71, paragraph .26, states “...he or she should attempt to make
such communications with the audit committee...” Use of the word “attempt,” without
providing guidance as to what would satisfy an “attempt”, appears to weaken this amendment
and make determinations of compliance difficult. We suggest changing the amendment to
read “... he or she should ensure that such communications with the audit committee...”
Further, we would add a sentence that reads “If the auditor is unable to ensure that such
communications occur prior to filing and/or public release of interim financial information, the
auditor should document their attempts to communicate with the client.”
Established in 1941, The Institute of Internal Auditors is an international professional
organization with world headquarters in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The IIA has over 70,000
members in internal auditing, governance, internal control, IT audit, education, and security.
With representation from more than 100 countries, The Institute is the acknowledged leader in
standards, certification, education, research, and technological guidance for the profession
worldwide.

Thank you again for allowing The IIA to provide our comments. If The IIA can provide
further assistance, please feel free to call me.

Sincerely,

William G. Bishop III, CIA

# 12
Defending Liberty
Pursuing Justice

SECTION OF

BUSINESS LAW

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

Section of Business Law
750 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 988-5588
FAX: (312) 988-5578
e-mail; businesslaw@abanet.org

website: www.gbanet.org/buslaw

November 30, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

Re:

Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement of Auditing Standards,
Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards ("SAS”) #61 and #71

Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Committee on Law and Accounting of the Section of Business Law of the
American Bar Association (the "Committee") appreciates the opportunity to comment on
the Exposure Draft described above relating to communications by auditors with audit
committees. This comment letter has been prepared by certain members of the Committee;
and a draft of this letter was circulated for comment among select members of the
Committee. All persons generally agreed with the substance of this draft. However, our
letter does not represent the official views of the Association, the Section or any of their
committees or subcommittees.
The Committee believes that the improvement of the effectiveness of audit
committees will have a significant beneficial impact upon financial reporting. Appropriate
and timely communication between an auditor and the audit committee will contribute
substantially to the effectiveness of audit committees. Accordingly, the Committee believes
that the proposed amendments to SAS #61 and #71 are positive pronouncements generally,
subject however, to the Committee’s following comments and suggestions:

As to SAS #61. We are in agreement with the Exposure Draft insofar as it requires
an auditor of Securities and Exchange Commission clients to discuss with the audit
committee judgments about the quality, and not just the acceptability, of the company’s
accounting principles and underlying estimates in its financial statements in accordance with
the definitions set forth in FASB Concepts Statement #2. While there are valid positions
pro and con on the issue of written communication by the auditor concerning the discussion
and in what detail to communicate, on balance, we do not believe that the auditor should be
precluded from communicating his or her judgments to the audit committee in writing.

Ms. Sherry Boothe
November 30, 1999
Page 2

Whether or not the auditor memorializes the discussion with a written communication as
well as the details thereof and whether such a communication would stifle an open and
frank discussion with the audit committee should remain a judgment call by the auditor,
possibly in consultation with the audit committee. Indeed it is not unusual for the audit
committee itself to make appropriate notes or memoranda concerning the discussion. Nor
should the auditor be limited in documenting the discussion in the auditor’s working papers
Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how the interests of either the audit committee or
the auditor are served by a blanket rule barring communicating by the latter to the former.
While the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations did not contemplate
management’s participation in the discussions between the auditor and the audit committee,
it is to be noted that the Exposure Draft assumes that management would be included as a
participant. We do not believe that such assumption should be included in the language of
the amendment. Again the choice of a two-way meeting or a three-way meeting or in some
cases two meetings, one between the auditors and the audit committee and the other with
the participation of management, should be based entirely on the facts and circumstances
involved and the judgment of the auditor and the audit committee.

As to SAS #71. The Exposure Draft provides that if the entity intends to release
interim financial information in a public announcement prior to the filing of the interim
financial information with a regulatory agency (such as the SEC) the auditor should attempt
to communicate any identified matters described in AU380 to the audit committee, or at
least its chairman. We believe that the word "attempt" may place too much of a burden
upon the auditor particularly when the timing of the release of the information may be
affected. Accordingly, we suggest that the auditor’s role under these circumstances should
be limited to an offer or indication of availability to make such communication.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft and should you
have any further questions, please contact Richard Rowe at (202) 416-6800 or Abraham
Stanger at (212) 218-5500.

Respectfully submitted,

C

Abranam M. Stanger

Chairman of the Drafting Group
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Roger L. Polark
Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer

November 26, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775

Dear Ms. Boothe:
After careful review of the AICPA’s October 1 Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement on Auditing
Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 Communication with Audit
Committees (SAS No. 61) and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71 Interim Financial
Information (SAS No. 71), we at Walgreen Co. wish to express concern regarding certain of those
recommendations. We previously expressed related concerns in a July 1, 1999 letter to the New
York Stock Exchange and in a November 24, 1999 letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

We agree that there is a need for active, independent audit committees that provide oversight and
monitoring of the financial reporting process. Thus, we support the AICPA’s efforts to improve the
quality of corporate financial reporting. However, we continue to have strong reservations about
certain of the recommendations that have been included in the AICPA’s proposed rules. In our
view, the proposed rules may decrease the responsibilities of outside auditors and transfer some of
their long-held responsibilities to boards of directors and audit committees. This, in turn, creates
new liabilities that may be pursued by increasingly litigious shareholder groups and their attorneys.

We believe that the Walgreen Co. audit committee adheres to the underlying principles espoused in
the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees'
report. We also believe that our audit committee acts in concert with the full board, company
financial management, our internal auditors and our external auditors to support full disclosure,
transparency and accountability. However, for the reasons stated, we take exception to the
following items:
The Committee’s recommendation 8, while rightfully encouraging an open, frank discussion of
accounting practices, adds a requirement for audit committee members to become knowledgeable
of the “quality” of the company’s accounting principles. In our letter to the New York Stock
Exchange we expressed concern that this requirement transfers a responsibility traditionally placed
on outside auditors and presumes that committee members could fully appreciate the many nuances
which may affect each decision made by company financial management. We acknowledge
AICPA’s attempt to address certain subjective matters in Recommendation 8 by eliminating
terminology such as “degree of aggressiveness or conservatism” in its proposed amendment to SAS
No. 61. We continue to believe, however, that because the term “quality” is undefined, any
application will be so subjective as to be meaningless. Outside auditors are and should be
responsible for reporting whether a company is adhering to Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles.

WALGREEN CO.

CORPORATE OFFICES

200 WILMOT ROAD

DEERFIELD, ILLINOIS 60015

847-914-3006 FAX 847-914-3652

In our letter to the New York Stock Exchange, we expressed concern that the Committee’s
recommendation 10 creates an unnecessary requirement for a quarterly discussion between the
outside auditor and one or more audit committee members, which may delay the timeliness of
reporting. We acknowledge that the AIPCA, in its proposed amendment to SAS No. 71, attempts
to respond to this concern by modifying the requirement so that the outside auditor does not have to
make communication of SAS No. 61 matters directly to the audit committee, but rather can satisfy
him or her self that management has made such communication via discussion with the audit
committee. This modification does not eliminate mandatory quarterly communication between the
outside auditor and the audit committee. Furthermore, the proposed amendment to SAS No. 71
still requires that the outside auditor attempt to discuss SAS No. 61 matters with the audit
committee prior to the filing of interim information with a regulatory agency, as well as prior to a
public announcement of such interim information. We continue to believe that such discussion
should take place when matters of significance arise, but should not be required in the absence of
such matters.

We remain supportive of ongoing efforts to ensure adequate oversight and monitoring of financial
statement preparation, and we appreciate your review and consideration of the foregoing
comments.

Sincerely,

Mr. R. L. Polark
Chief Financial Officer
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Mr. Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609
Re: File No. S7-22-99

Dear Mr. Katz:
The Timken Company offers the following comments in connection with new rules proposed by the
SEC intended to improve disclosure related to the functioning of corporate audit committees and to
enhance the reliability and credibility of financial statements of public companies.

We believe the most significant issue raised by the proposed rule changes is the shifting of the
responsibility for the accuracy of the company’s financial statements from management and the
inside and outside auditors to the audit committee, and the resultant risk of increased liability to
members of the audit committee. These increased risks are not offset by any significant advantages
to the financial reporting process because the audit committee’s responsibility is to oversee this
process, the adequacy of which is the primary responsibility of management and the auditors.
While the Commission did not adopt the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendation that the audit
committee certify that the company’s financial statements are fairly presented in conformity with
GAAP in all material respects, it does require that the audit committee disclose any material
misstatements or omissions that come to its attention as a result of the review and discussions with
management and the inside and outside auditors. In order to avoid the increased liability exposure
discussed below, the result of these added requirements may be to cause the audit committee to
micro-manage the audit process or second-guess the decisions made by management and the
auditors in preparing the financial statements.

No amount of accounting or financial expertise will compensate for the fact that the accounting rules
are ambiguous and complex. Inside and outside auditors are experts at analyzing and applying
these rules, and yet problems occur. The primary function of the audit
committee is and should remain oversight, not management, of the financial
reporting process.

THE TIMKEN COMPANY

Mail Code: GNE-01
1835 Dueber Avenue, S.W.
P.O. Box 6928
Canton, OH 44706-0928 U.SA.

Telephone: (330)471-4226
Facsimile: (330) 471-3541
E-mail: scherff@timken.com

Mr. Jonathan G. Katz
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609
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In addition, the increased responsibilities of the audit committee resulting from adoption of these
rules will significantly increase the time commitment of the members of the audit committee. In
conjunction with the potential for increased liability, these rules may discourage the recruitment
and/or retention of qualified directors for appointment to the audit committee. Ironically, this may
result in a decrease in the quality of oversight by audit committees.
The Commission has stated that it does not intend, by its proposed rules, to create new standards for
directors to fulfill their duties under state corporation law. In addition, the Commission does not
believe that its proposed rule changes will result in increased exposure to liability for members of the
audit committee. Indeed, the Commission believes that increased involvement by the audit
committee would decrease liability exposure under state corporation law because the more informed
the audit committee members become through its discussions with management and the auditors, the
more likely the business judgment rule will apply and provide protection for the audit committee’s
activities.

The flaw in this reasoning is that the Commission’s proposed rules are disclosure requirements. The
liability exposure is two-fold. First, if the audit committee has discussions with management and the
outside auditors and fails to notice any material misstatements or omissions, and problems
subsequently arise related to the company’s financial statements, such failure would lead the
plaintiff's bar to question the adequacy of those discussions. Second, if the audit committee chooses
not to have discussions with the outside auditors and management, and problems subsequently arise,
the plaintiff's bar will argue the committee failed to perform its duties by not conducting such
discussions. In effect, these disclosure rules will likely cause substantive changes in how the audit
committee operates.
We believe the appropriate role of the audit committee in connection with the financial reporting
process is oversight of management and the internal and external auditors. It is inappropriate and, in
fact, counterproductive to require the audit committee to make representations about the accuracy of
the company’s financial statements.

We are also concerned about one of the requirements imposed by the New York Stock Exchange in
connection with the charter of the audit committee. A copy of such charter would be required to be
included as a part of a company’s proxy statement every three years under the SEC proposal. This
requirement directs the audit committee to recommend “that the Board of Directors take appropriate
action to ensure (emphasis added) the independence of the outside auditor.” While it is certainly
appropriate for the audit committee to receive periodic reports from the outside auditors regarding
relationships outside the audit function and to engage in a dialogue with respect to such
relationships, as is also required by the NYSE as part of the charter, it is very difficult to “ensure”
independence. As a result of such a dialogue, the committee may be in a position to make certain
recommendations to the Board regarding the outside auditors, but such recommendations would not
necessarily result in any assurance that the auditors will be independent. To place such a burden on
the audit committee is unreasonable, and could raise liability concerns if a problem were to surface
that is somehow related to the independence of the outside auditors. The phrase “and for
recommending that the Board of Directors take appropriate action to ensure the independence of the
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outside auditor” should be stricken from the proposed Section 303.01 (B)(1)(b) of the NYSE Listed
Company Manual.
A third issue of concern that arises from the SEC proposal is connected to the requirement that
companies’ independent auditors review interim financial statements before they are filed with the
Commission. The problem arises from the proposed revisions to SAS 71 by the Auditing Standards
Board.
SAS 71 sets forth the procedure the auditors are required to follow for interim reviews. The
proposed revisions would require involvement by the audit committee, or at least its chair, every
quarter, whether or not any significant issues arose in connection with the review. Such a
requirement is unduly burdensome, and will not improve the quality of financial reporting or
disclosure. While we support contact with the audit committee if items of significance are
discovered in the interim review, the time of the committee chair and other members should not be
imposed upon on a routine basis without good reason. As previously noted, significantly increasing
the time commitments of members of the audit committee may discourage the service of qualified
directors on the committee.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our comments on the proposals, and believe our suggested
changes would enhance the overall recommendations.

cc: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: File 2280

THE TIMKEN COMPANY
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November 29,1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the •Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS), Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No.
61, Communication with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71,
Interim Financial Information.

We consistently have been supportive of the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (Blue Ribbon Committee), and
our CEO, James Schiro, was a member of the Committee. In this regard, we view the various
proposals by the New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers,
the American Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Auditing
Standards Board as consistent with the intent of the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee. We believe the combined impact of these rules will lead to a marked
improvement in financial reporting through the interactive efforts of audit committees,
management, and external auditors.
In this connection, we support the final issuance of the proposed SAS. We have a few
comments regarding specific aspects of the proposal that we submit for your consideration.

Part 1 - Communication with Audit Committees
Substance ofthe Communication

We are concerned that the technical language used to describe the substance of the discussion
(particularly the references to representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality and
consistency) may not be understandable to many practitioners, and certainly not
understandable to most audit committee members, who may look to this language to help them
frame their discussion with their auditors. Accordingly, we suggest that the fourth sentence of
proposed paragraph 11 be revised as follows: “The discussion should also include the impact
on the accounting information included in the financial statements of items such as the
following, if they are significant to the financial statements: ...”

The original Blue Ribbon Committee recommendation suggested that the discussion include
“such issues as the clarity of the company’s financial disclosures and degree of aggressiveness
or conservatism of the company’s accounting principles and underlying estimates and other
significant decisions made by management in preparing the financial disclosure.” The current
proposal refers to “the clarity ... of the entity’s accounting information contained in the
financial statements and related disclosures...” but not the “degree of aggressiveness or
conservatism” referred to above. We understand that some believe that the concept of
aggressiveness or conservatism is ambiguous and subjective. Nevertheless, we believe that
these terms, while not easily defined, are relatively easily understood in financial circles and
can serve as a useful benchmark for audit committee members. We would not object to the
inclusion of these concepts in the final standard.

Documentation ofthe Communication
The last two sentences of the proposed new paragraph 11 are an attempt to encourage an open
and frank discussion by not having the discussion hindered by the creation of a written record.
However, we are concerned that the sentences, as written, do not give adequate guidance on
the kind of written record that could be maintained by the auditor. Furthermore, we question
whether it is appropriate to restrict such a writing by the auditor. We suggest that these two
sentences be deleted, and that the auditor be permitted to use his or her discretion in creating
the appropriate documentation of such communication. If this change is made, the suggested
addition to paragraph 03 is not needed.

Part 2 - Interim Financial Information
The proposal indicates that the accountant should attempt to make the communication prior to
a public announcement of interim information if one is made. We believe that mandating such
communication prior to the earnings release would be both impractical and counterproductive.
Recognizing concerns about insider trading and differential disclosures, companies know they
need to release their quarterly earnings as soon as practicable. On the other hand, while
companies and their accountants are best served by discussing significant accounting matters
prior to earnings release, many aspects of the accountant’s review can, of necessity, only be
conducted after the company closes its books and prepares complete financial statements.
Compressing the timeframe for audit committee communications, and the associated pressure
to complete the review prior to such communication, may lead to either delays in
dissemination of financial information to the marketplace or pressure on the accountant to
reach premature conclusions.

Therefore, we suggest that the requirement for communication be limited to prior to the filing
of interim information with a regulatory agency.

***** *
If you have any questions regarding our comments, please feel free to contact James Gerson at
(973) 236 7247.

Very truly yours,

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
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Via Internet
sboothe@aicpa.org

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards No. 61 and No. 71
Dear Ms. Boothe:
Exxon Corporation would like to make the comments contained in this letter on the
proposed amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 (”SAS 61") and No. 71
("SAS 71"). The Exposure Draft dated October 1,1999 proposed amendments of SAS 61 that
would add paragraph 11 describing the discussion the auditor should have with the audit
committee about the quality of the entity’s accounting principles. We believe paragraph 11
covers the subject very well. In particular we agree that management should be an active
participant in the discussion. Frequently it should prove helpful to have the active
involvement of those who prepared the financial information and who can best address the
reasons for the choices made in accounting principles. At the same time, if the auditor desires
to speak to the audit committee alone, there should be an opportunity to do so.

We also support the decision to provide for an oral rather than a written
communication on this subject. We believe that the goal of an open and frank discussion is an
important purpose of this provision. That goal will be better served y oral communication.

As proposed in the Exposure Draft dated October 1, 1999, SAS 71 would include a new
paragraph .26. It would require an auditor who has conducted a review of an entity's interim
financial information prior to an SEC filing to attempt to communicate with the audit
committee (or at least its chairman) and a representative financial management prior to such
filing. We have no objection to that proposal. In fact, we have already undertaken such a
communication prior to the filing of Exxon's Form 10-Q for the third quarter of 1999.
However, proposed paragraph .26 further requires the auditor to attempt to make such
communication prior to the public announcement of such interim financial information, if it is

to be released prior to SEC filing. We believe this second requirement is a poor policy
decision, is counterproductive, and should be
deleted from the final form of paragraph .26 when it is adopted.
The vast majority of companies which are the subject of paragraph .26 (if not all of
them) do release their interim financial information prior to the required filing of the Form 10Q. This fulfills a valid investor desire for prompt financial information. Moreover, that
information can be very market sensitive, depending on the results released. We think it
would be a bad idea to be distributing such information to the members of the audit committee
prior to public release of the information. Most importantly, the chance of market sensitive
information falling into the hands of unintended recipients would be increased. This would be
contrary to the strong effort by SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, to prevents me market
participants receiving material information prior to its public release.
Furthermore, even if the confidentiality of the interim financial information could be
assured (which it cannot be), the public release of the information would be delayed.
Providing audit committee members a copy of the information (and allowing time for them to
review it) and providing the auditor the opportunity to speak to them on an informed basis
would have to delay the release of this information. Our estimate would be a delay of at least
one day. In a market where t is clear that there are substantial demands for release of such
information as promptly as possible, such a delay is totally counterproductive to the interests
of the market participants that paragraph .26 is supposed to enhance.

The Black & Decker Corporation
701 East Joppa Road
Towson, Maryland 21286
410 716 3419
Fax 410 716 3083
email: steve.howarth@bdk.com

Steven E. Howarth

#17

Vice President and General Auditor

BIACK&DECKER
November 30,1999
ALSO SENT VIA E-MAIL

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Reference: File 2280

Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Black & Decker Corporation appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft (ED),
Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 and No. 71.

Our comments are offered in light of management's continued focus on adequate, timely, and relevant
communication with our Audit Committee by the Independent and Interna, Auditors, along with Senior
Management as situations dictate.

Our comments on the issues raised in the ED follow. It should be noted that silence as to portions of
the ED should not be viewed as acquiescence, rather prioritization of our comments.
Communication with Audit Committees

We encourage active communication between management, auditors and the audit committee.
However, our view of an audit committee’s responsibility is to ensure the adequacy of a control frame
work over financial reporting. This control framework should provide for communication with the
committee over all types of risk involving business activities with financial reporting implications and
significant judgments in the financial reporting process. As the audit committee is a committee of the
board of directors, it has the authority and ability to make inquiries and requests of information from
management and auditors alike. In that regard, we believe the promulgation of a standard which
forces a limited communication of specified information may detract from the overall purpose of
improving the audit committee function.

The proposed requirement for external auditor discussion of their judgement over quality of the
company’s application of generally accepted accounting principles may dilute the objective evaluation
required by current standards and add to the volatility of comments to the committees, as judgments
over quality of broad applications of GAAP are likely to be unable to be defined. In providing
guidance for application of GAAP, current standards allow for professional judgement in their
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Ms. Sherry Boothe
AICPA

application. No doubt, disparity exists within management and independent accountants as to their
judgements. The added evaluation of “quality" would add to the subjectivity of reported information
and may detract from the requirement for the external auditor to make overall judgements over the
application of GAAP in the financial statements, taken as a whole.

We do believe that healthy discussions over new or revised applications of GAAP are of value to the
audit committee. As a group (audit committee, management, internal and external audit) we often
present and discuss views on these matters, however, we believe it is limiting and subjective to make
an overall assertion of quality.

Furthermore, current professional standards allow for and encourage the adaptability of company
policies within the guidelines of GAAP given economic and operational activities which are in constant
evolution. The lack of guidance provided in this standard would allow for broad interpretation of
subjective levels of “quality" and detract from the pertinent matter of application of generally accepted
accounting principles which are quite clear on the differing accounting treatment and disclosure for
changes in accounting principles and policies.
Furthermore, the ASB appears contradictory in this proposal, precluding written communication to the
committee, significantly detracting from the effectiveness of the proposed process. Surely the ASB is
recognizing the lack of objective criteria provided to management and auditors in making such an
evaluation. For instance, in periods of personnel changes in senior members of independent auditors
and management committee members, documented communications would provide the necessary
background for continuity in such assessments. We question how this proposal could therefore add
to the effectiveness of the audit committee.
Communications Related to Timely Quarterly Review

We believe open, meaningful dialogue among management, independent and internal auditors and
the audit committee is critical to the effectiveness of the oversight of the financial reporting process.
However, the proposed guidance suggesting that timely quarterly discussions would facilitate such
discussion seems to reduce or change the significance of proactive activities at regular audit
committee meetings and ignores the importance of open access to the committee by the external
auditor throughout the audit process. We believe these forums currently provide opportunities for
such discussion amongst all parties.

Therefore, we would encourage timely communication with the audit committee by the external
auditor only when matters so dictate. Further, requiring communication on a positive (vs. negative)
assurance basis may be misleading to the committee in light of the limited scope of interim reviews by
the external auditor.
Should you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Steven E. Howarth
Vice President & Genera, Auditor

COMMENT LETTER #18

November 30, 1999
Virginia Society of
Certified Public Accountants
Accounting and Auditing Procedures Committee
5813 Hamlet Road
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23464

Office 757.683.3514
FAX 757-683-5639
E-Mail dziegenf@odu.edu
Sherry Boothe,
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775

Dear Sherry:
The Accounting and Auditing Committee of the Virginia Society of Certified Public
Accountants offers the following comments concerning the AICPA Exposure Draft of a
proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, “Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71,
Interim Financial Information.”
In general, we believe that this exposure draft is an excellent and comprehensive revision to
those SASs incorporating the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit
Committees. We have no substantive corrections or additions to the exposure draft. We
recommend its adoption because we feel its provisions will strengthen the financial reporting
process.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this exposure draft and we await the final
version of the standard.
Sincerely,

Dr. Douglas E. Ziegenfuss, CPA
Chair

COMMENT LETTER #19

With respect to the proposal in paragraph 11 regarding required communications regarding the
quality of accounting principles, I believe the communications should be in writing and
specific. The way this proposal is drafted, it appears to be a total "CYA" attempt on behalf of
the CPA firms, without doing justice to the recommendations of Chairman Leavitt. The CPA
firms are best positioned by getting as many of the potentially contentious issues on the table,
in writing, to eliminate potential confusion or misunderstanding on the part of the audit
committee and senior management. This proposal just validates the current smoke and mirrors
shuffle being performed by the Big 5 firms in an attempt to maintain clients in the face of a
deteriorating audit service offering at a time of increasing standards complexity.

At a recent financial reporting symposium in Chicago, I made the recommendation (with
tongue only partly in cheek), which was greeted by gasps from the Big 5 representatives on the
panel, that the traditional "Summary of Passed Adjustments" that is prepared by CPA firms
during the course of the audit be filed as a schedule to the annual Form 10-K filing. The
schedule could be referred to as supplemental information in the audit report (or covered by a
separate statement) and management would have the opportunity to take exception to the
schedule if they so chose.

The point that everyone is missing, including the SEC with the recent issuance of SAB 99, is
that you cannot mandate morality in financial reporting. This proposed amendment to the
SAS’s does nothing substantive to address the issues raised by the BRC and, in fact, puts the
profession in a less defensible position with respect to the quality of its services. The
profession and the investing public will always best served by making as much relevant and
reliable information available as possible. By making the aforementioned information
available, the public can then improve their own investing decisions, based in part on
JUDGMENTS made by the CPA firms. Disclosing such information would also further the
efforts to close the age-old "expectations gap", as the public would get a better appreciation of
the types of JUDGMENTS that underpin the issuance of an opinion (read a JUDGMENT
issued in writing) on a set of financial statements.
With the move to more of a real-time reporting model, the trend in the auditing profession
should be in the direction of providing additional substantive information to the investing
public and other users of audited financial statements. These proposed amendments appear to
do more to support an auditor in a court of law when defending a claim of audit failure /
negligence than to be a bona fide response to the BRC recommendations.
We as a profession can do better than this.

Sincerely,

Lawrence P. Brown - CPA
Chicago, Illinois

UW
UNIVERSITY OF

WASHINGTON
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Dr. Kathryn Kadous
Department of Accounting, Box 353200
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3200

November 30,1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attestation Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards: Amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No. 71
Dear Ms. Boothe:

Attached please find an academic research paper that provides empirical evidence regarding
two issues in the above-referenced proposed auditing standard. The study uses an experimental
methodology to assess the likely effectiveness of the proposals. Professional auditors from a
Big Five accounting firm participated in the study.
Discussions about the Quality of Accounting Methods (Proposed amendments to SAS
No. 61)
Data in our study provide no evidence that discussions between the auditor and the audit
committee about the quality and appropriateness of earnings will mitigate against aggressive
reporting. In our data, experienced auditors are more likely to identify a client-preferred,
aggressive accounting method as the most appropriate method and are more likely deem it to
be acceptable when pressure on the auditor to agree with the client is higher. Further, an
explicit request that auditors evaluate the quality, not just the acceptability, of the client's
preferred accounting method does not reduce, and sometimes elevates, the likelihood that
auditors will deem an aggressive method to be acceptable. Please refer to the attached paper
for details.

Pre-Announcement/Pre-Filing Reviews (Proposed amendments to SAS No. 71)
Our study indicates that earlier auditor involvement in a client firm's decisions about
accounting methods likely will mitigate against aggressive financial reporting. Specifically, we
find that experienced Big Five auditors are less likely to deem a client’s aggressive accounting
method to be acceptable when the auditor is involved in management's decision making
before, rather than after, quarterly statements have been released to the public and filed with

the SEC. This effect is attributed to the fact that late involvement with contentious issues puts
pressure on the auditor to accept client-preferred accounting methods. Please refer to the
attached paper for details.

Thank you for the opportunity to bring our study to your attention.

Sincerely,
Kathryn Kadous
Assistant Professor

Auditors1 Judgments of the Acceptability of Client-Preferred
Accounting Methods

Kathryn Kadous*
Jane Kennedy*

Mark E. Peecher**
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Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards; File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036-8775
Re:

Exposure Draft, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information

Dear Ms. Boothe:

One of the objectives that the Council of the American Institute of CPAs established for the
PCPS Executive Committee is to act as an advocate for all local and regional firms and
represent those firms' interests on professional Issues, primarily through the Technical Issues
Committee ("TIC"). This communication is in accordance with that objective.
TIC has reviewed the above referenced exposure draft and is providing the following
comments and suggestions for your consideration.

General
The members of TIC appreciate having had the earlier opportunity to informally provide input
regarding the appropriate scope of the anticipated exposure draft. TIC believes that the scope
of the exposure draft as set forth in paragraph 11 is appropriate. TIC members agree that, as
stated in the summary of the SAS No. 61 amendments, “the application of this requirement to
non-SEC organizations that have audit committees may not be meaningful and cost-effective
at this time.”

Part 1 - Paragraph 11
If adopted as proposed, paragraph 11 of SAS No. 61 would require the auditor to discuss with
the audit committee the auditor’s judgments about the “quality,” not just the acceptability, of
the entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. That paragraph would
also prohibit written communications of the auditor’s judgments because “objective criteria
have not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of the quality of an entity’s
accounting measurements and disclosures.”

Definition of “Quality”

TIC members are concerned that the “quality” of an entity’s accounting principles is not
defined in today’s literature and that due to the lack of the objective criteria noted above, the
proposed requirement will be difficult to apply and will not be operational.
The requirement to discuss “quality” seems to put the auditor in the position of “judging”
generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). Presumably, if accounting principles are
in accordance with GAAP, they are acceptable. If they are not acceptable and the impact is
material, this would result in an adjustment or a proposed adjustment that would be reported
under the current SAS No. 61 requirements. Furthermore, TIC believes that if an auditor
communicates to an entity’s audit committee that certain accounting principles, while
acceptable, are of a “low quality,” that auditor may ultimately be exposed to increased liability
should that entity fail.
The difficulty in applying the proposed requirement can be illustrated through an example of a
hypothetical entity that sells only one product - metal “widgets.” Such an entity would have
the option to select a first-in first-out (“FIFO”) or a last-in first-out (“LIFO”) cost flow
assumption for its inventory valuation. FIFO and LIFO are both acceptable methods of
accounting for inventory and all other things being equal, it is unclear whether one cost flow
method would be of a “higher quality” versus the other method.

Written Communications
Given the various issues and concerns noted above, the members of TIC believe that the
communications covered by paragraph 11 could be subject to misunderstanding or
misinterpretation by audit committees. Consequently, TIC recommends that the auditor be
given the option of documenting those communications in writing.

Part 2 - Paragraph 25
The proposed revision to paragraph 25 of SAS No. 71 would require auditors of SEC clients to
consider whether any of the matters described in SAS No. 61, as they relate to interim
financial information, have been identified. If so, the auditor should communicate them to the
audit committee or be satisfied, through discussions with the audit committee, that such
matters have been communicated to the audit committee by management.

Matters to be Communicated
TIC members believe that it is unclear whether the matters to be communicated pursuant to the
revised paragraph 25 would include the “quality” of an entity’s accounting principles as
contemplated by the proposed revisions to SAS No. 61. Consequently, TIC recommends that
this issue be clarified.

We appreciate the opportunity to present these comments on behalf of PCPS member firms.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Candace Wright, Chair
PCPS Technical Issues Committee

CW:lec
cc:
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November 30, 1999
RE: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards: Amendments to Statements on
Auditing Standards No. 61 Communications with Audit Committees and No. 71
Interim Financial Information-File 2280

Sherry Boothe, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York NY 10036-8775

Dear Ms. Boothe,
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants is pleased to submit the
attached comments on the proposed amendments to statements on auditing standards.
The Society’s Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee developed the comments.
We would be pleased to respond to questions you may have about the comments.
Very truly yours,

Vincent J. Love, CPA
Chair
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee

cc: James L. Craig, Jr., Technical Services
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee
Accounting and Auditing Committee Chairs

NYSSCPA Committee on Auditing Standards and Procedures

Comments on the Exposure Draft

Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards
Amendments to
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61
Communications with Audit Committees
And
Statement no Auditing Standards No. 71
Interim Financial Information
The Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee of the New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants (the “Committee”) would like to thank the AICPA Auditing Standards Board

(the “Board”) for this opportunity to comment on the Proposed Statement of Auditing Standards,

Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communications with Audit
Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information.

While we believe overall that the proposed amendments are appropriate, we question the timing
of the Exposure Draft. Why not wait until the SEC issues the proposed rule(s) that are mentioned
in the Exposure Draft as the genesis of the recommended changes. Of course, if the SEC issues

its proposed rule(s) by the time the amendments are issued and the amendments properly address
the proposed rule(s), this timing comment is moot.

As to the prohibition against any written communication with an entity’s audit committee

concerning the quality of the entity’s accounting principles and underlying estimates in its
financial statements, we believe the choice of communication media should be left to the auditor.

The wording in the Exposure Draft should recommend that the communication be oral and not in
writing to facilitate a more frank and open discussion, but it should not prohibit written

communications.

The Committee greatly appreciates this opportunity to comment on the proposed amendments
and hopes that its recommendations are helpful to the Board.

DEC-02-39
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November 30,1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775

Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)—Comment Letter
Amendments to SAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees
and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information
Dear Ms. Boothe:
We are pleased to submit this comment letter to the Auditing Standards Board with
regard to the Proposed SAS Amendments to SAS No. 61, Communications With Audit
Committees and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information, and we are supportive of the
issuance of this SAS. We have supported the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC), and we also support
the proposed changes to promptly implement the recommendations which apply to
auditing standards.

We have the following recommendations to further improve the Exposure Draft:
1. We recommend that the wording in the amendments to SAS 61 revert to the
“aggressive or conservative” wording recommended by the Blue Ribbon
Committee.
2. We recommend the communication of the “quality, not just the acceptability,
of the company’s accounting principles” be integrated with the existing
communication requirements regarding accounting policies and estimates
rather than added as a new item in the list.

3. The discussion contemplated by the amendments to SAS 61 would be
appropriate as part of the annual communication with the audit committee of
matters related to the conduct of the audit, but we do not believe it would be
appropriate as part of a discussion resulting from a quarterly review.
Accordingly, we recommend that the amendment state that this discussion
need not apply to quarterly reviews.
4. We recommend that the amendments to SAS 71, as they relate to the
importance of the timing of the discussion between the auditor and the audit
committee, revert to the stated approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon
Committee, that is that the matter be discussed “...prior to the filing of the
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Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any public announcement of financial
results)...”

Attached to this letter is a further discussion of each recommendation.

We would be pleased to discuss our comments with members of the Auditing Standards
Board or its staff.
Sincerely,
Ernst & Young LLP

Attachments A & B
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ATTACHMENT A

Comments on Proposed SAS Amendments to SAS No. 61,
Communications With Audit Committees
BRC Recommendation 8 states the following:
The Committee recommends that Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) require that a
company's outside auditor discuss with the audit committee the auditor's judgments about the
quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles as applied in its financial
reporting; the discussion should include such issues as the clarity of the company’s financial
disclosures and degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of the company’s accounting
principles and underlying estimates and other significant decisions made by management in
preparing the financial disclosure and reviewed by the outside auditors. This requirement should
be written in a way to encourage open, frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate.

In response to this recommendation, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board developed an
amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit
Committees, that would:

•

require that the auditor discuss the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the
acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles with the audit committees of
SEC clients.

•

require the discussion to include such matters as the consistency of application of the
entity’s accounting policies and the clarity, consistency, and completeness of the
entity's accounting information contained in the financial statements and related
disclosures. The discussion is also to include certain items that have a significant
impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, and consistency
of the accounting information included in the financial statements. Examples of
items that may have such impact are the following:
-

selection of new or changes to accounting policies

-

estimates, judgments, and uncertainties

-

unusual transactions

-

accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, including
the timing of transactions and the period in which they are recorded

•

encourage a three-way discussion among the auditor, management, and the audit
committee.

•

prohibit auditors from communicating in writing the auditor’s judgments.

In providing background on this recommendation, the BRC report described other
required communications that presently exist in auditing standards (including matters
such as disagreements with management, consultations with other accountants,
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ATTACHMENT A

difficulties in performing the audit, and reportable conditions). In contrast, the
Committee report described the need for information on the more subjective judgments
concerning estimates, elective accounting principles and new significant transactions, and
the report recommended that the amendments to the standards be written in a way to
encourage an open, frank discussion of such matters and to avoid boilerplate.

In developing the specific wording for the proposed amendments to SAS 61 to implement
this recommendation, the Auditing Standards Board replaced the term “degree of
aggressiveness or conservatism” with terms taken from FASB Concept Statement 2. This
was done in the belief that such terms would facilitate a frank and open discussion
because they were already reflected and defined in FASB literature as fundamental
concepts underlying quality financial accounting and reporting and were already
applicable to a company’s accounting policies. However, in using such technical
terminology, the exposure draft of the amendments moves away from terms that are more
commonly used—such as “aggressive” or “conservative” policies—and emphasizes terms
that are less well understood—such as “representational faithfulness”. Although such
technical terms are taken from FASB literature, using them as the basis for the
communications described by the Blue Ribbon Committee report is not likely to facilitate
an “open, frank discussion” between the auditor and audit committee.
Additionally, the amendments to SAS 61 make clear that management should be an
active participant in the discussions. We concur with this change, but also believe that
the inclusion of management along with the audit committee further increases the
importance of using terminology in common usage such as “aggressive and
conservative.”

Accordingly, we recommend that the wording in the amendments to SAS 61 revert to the
“aggressive or conservative” wording recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Further, this amendment proposes adding this additional communication requirement as a
new item in the list of items in SAS 61. However, the nature of this item overlaps
existing communications already required, especially those regarding “significant
accounting policies” (AU380.07) and “management judgements and accounting
estimates” (AU380.08). We believe that the discussion of the quality of accounting
principles should be conducted as a part of the discussion of significant accounting
policies and estimates. Accordingly, we recommend the communication of the “quality,
not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles” be integrated with the
existing communication requirements regarding accounting policies and estimates rather
than added as a new item in the list.

Finally, the discussion contemplated by this amendment would be appropriate as part of
the annual communication with the audit committee of matters related to the conduct of
the audit, but we do not believe it would need to be part of a discussion resulting from a
quarterly review. Accordingly, we recommend that the amendment state that this
discussion need not apply to quarterly reviews.
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ATTACHMENT B

Comments on Proposed SAS Amendments to SAS No. 71,
Interim Financial Information
BRC Recommendation 10 states the following:
The Committee recommends that the SEC require that a reporting company's outside auditor
conduct a SAS 71 Interim Financial Review prior to the company's tiling of its Form 10-Q.
The Committee further recommends that SAS 71 be amended to require that a reporting
company's outside auditor discuss with the audit committee, or at least its chairman, and a
representative of financial management, in person, or by telephone conference call, the matters
described in AU Section 380, Communications With the Audit Committee, prior to the tiling of the
Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any public announcement of financial results), including
significant adjustments, management judgments and accounting estimates, significant new
accounting policies and disagreements with management.

In response to this recommendation, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board developed an
amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information,
that would:
•

clarify that the auditor should communicate to the audit committee those matters
described in section 380, Communication With Audit Committees, when they have
been identified in the conduct of interim financial reporting

•

require an auditor of an SEC client to attempt to discuss with the audit committee the
matters described in SAS No. 61 prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q

•

require an auditor of an SEC client to attempt to have this discussion prior to the
entity releasing interim financial information in a public announcement (if the
announcement is made prior to the filing ofForm 10-Q)

In providing background on this recommendation, the BRC recognized that the auditors’
ability to fulfill this requirement would be dependent on the cooperation and availability
of financial management and the audit committee. In keeping with this reality, we agree
with Auditing Standards Board’s insertion of the word ‘attempt’ into the amendment
language.
Based on the BRC background discussion and the recommendation itself, we believe that
the BRC’s primary intent was to require the involvement of the auditor in interim
financial reporting “prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any
public announcement of financial results).” The proposed amendments to SAS 71 go
beyond the BRC recommendation, as they put the importance of the timing of the
discussion relative to the filing of the Form 10-Q and publication of financial results on
an equal footing by stating that the discussion occur prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q
and prior to any public announcement of financial results.
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An entity’s process for making a public announcement of financial results differs from
the process for filing Form 10-Q. The process for filing Form 10-Q is typically more
formal, and more involved, than the process for the public announcement of financial
results. Accordingly, we recommend that the amendments to SAS 71, as they relate to
the importance of the timing of the discussion between the auditor and the audit
committee, revert to the stated approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee.
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Deloitte &
Touche
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Ten Westport Road
P.O. Box 820
Wilton, Connecticut 06897-0820

Telephone: (203) 761-3000

November 30, 1999
Ms. Kim Gibson
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

Re: File 2280

Dear Ms. Gibson:
We are pleased to comment on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Amendments to
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees, and
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information.
We fully support amending existing standards to adopt requirements directed toward
improving the quality of communications with audit committees. We believe that the proposal
is an important step forward in providing additional information that may assist audit
committees in overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure process and thereby contribute
to increasing the audit committee’s effectiveness. However, we believe that the prohibition on
written communications to audit committees regarding the auditor’s judgments about the
quality of the entity’s accounting practices and disclosures is not practicable for the reasons
discussed in the attachment to this letter and should be deleted from the proposed standard.
Also, we believe that additional guidance is needed concerning the communication of matters
noted in a review of interim financial information as discussed in the attachment to this letter.
Additionally, we have some recommendations concerning the proposed standard’s effective
date and several editorial comments for your consideration, as described in the attachment to
this letter. Our recommended revisions to the proposed standard are shown in bold text and
strike-through text.

Please contact Robert C. Steiner at (203) 761-3438 if you wish to discuss our comments.
Sincerely,

Attachment

DeloitteTouche
Tohmatsu

Attachment
Part 1, Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61

Paragraph 1

We strongly believe the prohibition on written communications to audit committees regarding
the auditor’s judgments about the quality of the entity’s accounting practices and disclosures in
the proposed standard is unworkable. Although we agree that an oral discussion with the audit
committee will elicit more open and frank discussions, we also recognize that a written
communication may be necessary or appropriate in certain situations. For example, if an audit
committee is unwilling to engage in a discussion, the auditor would be unable to discharge his
or her responsibility under generally accepted auditing standards unless a written
communication is permitted. Also, an audit committee may request the auditor to render a
written communication that summarizes the significant matters that were communicated
orally—a request that the auditor may be unable to decline. Accordingly, we recommend that
paragraph 3 of SAS No. 61 not be amended, as proposed, and that the prohibition against
communicating in writing the matters discussed be deleted from the proposed standard.
We recommend that paragraph 11 be revised to read as follows:
11. In connection with each SEC engagement (see paragraph .01)
the auditor should discuss with the audit committee the auditor's
judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the entity's
accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. Since the primary
responsibility for establishing an entity's accounting principles rests with
management, the discussion should generally would include management
as an active participant. The discussion generally would should include
such matters as the consistency of application of the entity's accounting
policies and the clarity, consistency, and completeness of the entity's
accounting information contained in the financial statements and related
disclosures. The discussion would should also include items that have a
significant impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability,
neutrality, and consistency4 of the accounting information included in the
financial statements. Examples of items that may have such impact are
the following:

•
•
•
•
•

•

The critical elements of internal control that assure the effectiveness of
the financial reporting process
Selection of new or changes to accounting policies
Estimates, judgments, and uncertainties
Unusual transactions, including transactions with related parties
Accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items,
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they are
recorded
The adjustments proposed by the auditor that were not recorded and
management's reasons for not recording them

4 The terms “representational faithfulness,” “verifiability,” “neutrality,” and “consistency” are
discussed in FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2, “Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information,” paragraphs 63-64, 81-89, 98-110 and 120-122, respectively.

The discussion should be tailored to the entity's specific circumstances,
including accounting applications and practices not explicitly addressed in
the accounting literature, for example, those that may be unique to an
industry. Objective criteria have not been developed to aid in the
consistent evaluation of the quality of an entity's accounting
measurements and disclosures. Given this lack of objective criteria and to
facilitate an open and frank discussion, the auditor's judgments ordinarily
should would be communicated orally not bo communicated in writing. If
the communication is made orally,5a result the auditor need only
document in the working papers that the discussion has taken place, the
date of the discussion, and the participants.
5 [Old footnote 4 renumbered to footnote 5]

Part 2, Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71

Paragraph 3

We support the proposed requirement that the accountant communicate timely with the audit
committee. Situations may arise wherein the audit committee may believe it unnecessary to
have discussions with the accountant upon completion of the review. In those circumstances,
we believe the accountant should cover those matters when making the communications
specified by paragraph 6 through 16 of AU Section 380 (as amended) incidental to the annual
audit. We recommend the addition to the proposed standard of guidance to that effect.
Additionally, we believe that clarification is needed with respect to the specific matters
described in AU Section 380 that should be communicated to the audit committee arising out
of a review of interim information. Certain of the matters discussed in AU Section 380, such
as the auditors’ responsibility under GAAS and difficulties encountered in performing the
audit are not applicable to reviews of quarterly information. In addition, the accountant’s
responsibility for other information in documents containing interim information is addressed
in AU Sections 722.33 and 550. Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed standard state
that, to the extent applicable, the matters described in paragraphs 7 through 10, 13 and 14 of
SAS No. 61 (as amended and renumbered by SAS No. 89 and Part 1 of this proposed standard)
should be communicated to the audit committee as a result of the accountant having performed
a review of interim financial information (i.e., significant accounting policies, management
judgments and accounting estimates, audit adjustments that could have a significant effect on
the entity’s financial reporting process, disagreements with management and consultations
with other accountants).

Finally, we recommend that the proposed standard explicitly acknowledge, as AU Section 380
does, that the communication may be written or oral, and if oral, that the accountant document
the matters discussed by memorandum or other notation in the working papers.

Accordingly, we recommend paragraph 3 be revised to read as follows:

2

3. This amendment revises SAS No. 71 (AU sec. 722.25) and includes a new paragraph (AU
sec. 722.26) to reflect recommendation number 10 of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. It requires auditors of SEC
clients to attempt to discuss with audit committees the matters described in SAS No. 61,
paragraphs .07 through .10, .13 and .14, preferably prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q or,
if applicable, prior to a public announcement of interim information. The new language is
shown in boldface italics; deleted language is shown by strikethrough. [AU sec. 722.26-.44
is renumbered 722.27-.45.]

.25 In performing the procedures in paragraphs .13 through .19, the
accountant may identify should consider whether any of the matters described in
paragraphs .07 through .10, .13 and .14 of section 380, Communication With
Audit Committees, that as theyrelate to the interim financial information, have
boon identified and that If such matters should be communicated to the audit
committee. The accountant should communicate them to the audit committee or
be satisfied, through discussions with the audit committee, that such matters
have been communicated to the audit committee by management. For instance,
the accountant should determine that the audit committee is informed about the
process used by management in formulating particularly sensitive accounting
estimates or about a change in a significant accounting policy affecting the
interim financial information.

.26 When the accountant has conducted the review prior to the entity's
filing of the interim financial information with a regulatory agency (such as the
SEC), he or she should attempt to make such communications withcommunicate
the matters noted to the audit committee, or at least its chairman, and a
representative of financial management prior to such filing. If the entity intends to
release interim financial information in a public announcement prior to such filing,
the accountant should attempt to make such communications prior to such public
announcement. If such communications are not made prior to the public
announcement or filing, as applicable, because the audit committee does not
wish to have a timely communication, they should be made as soon as
practicable in the circumstances.8 The communications may be oral or written. If
the matters are communicated orally, the accountant should document the
matters communicated by appropriate memoranda or other notations in the
review working papers.

8

If the audit committee does not wish to have a timely communication of matters relating to the
interim financial information, the accountant should include communication of those matters in
the communications specified by AU Section 380 in connection with the annual audit.

[Old footnotes 8-18 renumbered 9-19]

Paragraph 4
The SEC has proposed new rules that, if adopted, would require prefiling reviews of quarterly
financial information and has sought input on a number of issues, the resolution of which
could require further modification of AU Section 722. Those issues include whether a
requirement that the review report be filed with the SEC be adopted, and whether the review
report should set forth the scope of the review procedures performed. Accordingly, we believe
the proposed standard should be issued only after analysis of the additional effects on AU

3

Section 722, if any, of the SEC’s final requirements for timely review of interim financial
information.

It may be that the final standard cannot be issued any earlier than the first quarter of the
calendar 2000, and considering the work loads of preparers and auditors during that time of
year, we believe it would not be feasible to implement the requirements of Part 2 of the
proposed standard for the first quarter of the calendar year 2000 (or even the second quarter,
depending on the actual issuance date). We believe an effective date should be set for a year in
which the standard may be first applied for all quarters. Accordingly, we recommend that the
effective date for this part of the proposed standard be for interim periods in fiscal years
beginning on or after June 15, 2000. However, we would not object to permitting earlier
application, including mid-year adoption during calendar year 2000.

4

New York State Bar Association
One Elk Street. Albany. New York 12207 -518/463-3200 • http://www.nysba.org

NYSBA

#25

BUSINESS LAW SECTION
1999-2000 Executive Committee
RAYMOND H. SEITZ
Chair
Phillips Lytle et al
3400 HSBC Center
Buffalo, NY 14203
716/847-7065
FAX 716/852-6100
SIMEON GOLD
First Vice-Chair
Weil. Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153
212/310-8226
FAX 212/735-4710
JOHN B. KINUM
Second Vice-Chair
and Fiscal Officer
McNamee Lochner et al
PO Box 459
Albany, NY 12201
518/447-3200
FAX 518/426-4260
RICHARD E. GUTMAN
Secretary
Exxon Corporation
5959 Las Colinas Blvd.
Irving, TX 75039
972/444-1480
FAX 972/444-1432
Delegates to the House of Delegates:
Frederick G. Attea
Ann E. Evanko

MEMBERS:
SAMUELF.ABERNETHY
New York City
VINCENT N. AMATO
Montvale, NJ
GERALD S. BACKMAN
New York City
JEFFREY BAGNER
New York City
GREGORY J. BLASI
New York City
ROBERT B. CALIHAN
Rochester
JAMES S. CARR
New York City
EDWARD H. COHEN
New York City
PETER N. CUBITA
New York City
RONALD F DAITZ
New York City
ROBERT E.GANZ
Albany
DAVID L. GLASS
New York City
IRA L. HERMAN
New York City
DAVID J. KAUFMANN
New York City
HAROLD L KESTENBAUM
Jericho

GUY P LANDER
New York City

PETER W. LaVIGNE
New York City
JULIAN S.MILLSTEIN
New York City
NORMAN R NELSON
New York City
JAMES W. ORBAND
Binghamton
JOHN J RAPISARDI

New York City

ALAN D. REITZFELD
New York City
BRUCE A. RICH
New York City
GARY M. SCHOBER
Buffalo
STEPHEN F. SELIG
New York City

SANDRA STERN
New York City
GRACE STERRETT
Albany
WARREN W TRAIGER
New York City

December 2, 1999

AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
E-mail address: sboothe@aicpa.org
Attention: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards

Re:

Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees,
and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim
Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280

Ladies & Gentlemen:

The Committee on Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of
the New York State Bar Association appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the AICPA’s proposed amendments to SAS 61 and SAS 71
(the “Proposal”). The Proposal is in response to the recommendations
made in the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees for
implementation by the AICPA, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and stock exchanges.

The Committee on Securities Regulation is composed of members of the
New York State Bar Association, a principal part of whose practice is in
securities regulation. The Committee includes lawyers in private practice
and in corporation law departments. A draft of this letter was circulated
for comment among members of the Committee and the views expressed
in this letter are generally consistent with those of the majority of the
members who reviewed the letter in draft form. The views set forth in this
letter, however, are those of the Committee and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the organizations with which its members are associated, the
New York State Bar Association, or its Business Law Section.

Do the Public Good • Volunteer for Pro Bono

A.

General

The Proposal, together with related proposals of the Commission and the stock exchanges, are
intended to make audit committees more effective. The Committee generally agrees with the
Proposal, provided that the changes discussed below are made.

B.

SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.

The Proposal would require that the auditor’s discussion with the audit committee go beyond
the acceptability of the company’s accounting principles and include various items relating to
the auditor’s judgments about the “quality” of the company’s accounting principles.

The additional discussion would include: consistency of application of accounting policies;
clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information; items that have a
significant impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of
the accounting information, such as selection of new or changes to accounting policies,
estimates, judgments and uncertainties, unusual transactions, and accounting policies relating
to significant financial statement items.
While we agree with most of the specific items to be discussed by the auditors with the audit
committee where significant, we oppose the requirement to discuss the “quality” of the
accounting principles because that term has no objective standards in the accounting literature.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard, not
“quality.” The Proposal itself even prohibits the auditor from communicating its judgments
about “quality” in writing in order to facilitate an open and frank discussion and because of the
lack of criteria. Therefore, we urge the AICPA to eliminate the requirement to discuss the
“quality” not just the acceptability of the company’s accounting principles.
We are concerned that the “quality” proposal could lead to lawsuits and possible liability for
audit committees and their members because they would be subject to a standard for financial
statements that has no established meaning. This new potential for litigation and liability also
could discourage qualified persons from serving on audit committees. The AICPA apparently
recognizes this potential for increased liability insofar as auditors are concerned in the
Proposal’s prohibition on auditors expressing judgments on “quality” in writing.

Finally, we urge that terms such as “clarity”, “neutrality” and “representational faithfulness” be
deleted because they do not have a recognized objective meaning. Those terms, and “quality”,
are based on a conceptual framework put out by FASB in 1980. While the average reader may
think a discussion on “quality” somehow has to do with superiority or excellence, in the
Concepts Statement the focus is on the qualities or characteristics of accounting information to
be considered in developing accounting standards. The term “quality” and such other terms
were not intended to be standards for the application of generally accepted accounting
principles in a company’s financial reporting.

Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information
(May 1980).

C.

SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.

a.

Discussion Regarding Interim Financials

SAS 71 presently requires the auditors to have SAS 61 discussions for annual audits. The
Proposal would require SAS 61 discussions in connection with interim financials. Under the
new Proposal, the auditor would have to communicate to the audit committee, or be satisfied
through discussions with the audit committee, that management communicated to the
committee any SAS 61 matters identified in the conduct of the interim financial review.

We agree with the proposal to require a discussion of SAS 61 information identified in
connection with interim financial statements, provided that the SAS 61 information is modified in
accordance with our comments to eliminate the requirement to discuss the “quality” of
accounting principles and delete certain of the proposed items, as discussed above.
The major accounting firms are in most cases now requiring such reviews for new audit
engagements. In addition, many large corporations already have SAS 61 type discussions with
their auditors in connection with their interim financial statements. We believe that the Proposal
will not add significantly to the burden and expense of auditor reviews for most companies,
although some companies who do not now have SAS 71-type reviews on interim financial
statements will face additional cost and delays in release of interim financial statements.

b.

Transition Period

Finally, those companies who presently do not have SAS 71-type reviews for interim financials
will need time to coordinate future audit committee meetings with the internal review timetables,
establish procedures and make other necessary arrangements to implement the new
requirements. Under the currently proposed effective date, the new requirements would apply
to first calendar quarter 2000 interim financial statements for calendar year companies. This
would not permit adequate time to implement the new requirements.
Therefore, we
recommend that the proposed effectiveness of the new requirements be extended one year.
c.

Timing of Discussions Regarding Interim Financials

We agree that the independent auditor should discuss SAS 61 matters identified with respect to
interim financial statements with the audit committee, or the chair of the committee, and
company financial management prior to filing the Form 10-Q.
We also believe that some large companies already have SAS 61 discussions prior to public
announcement of results. Those companies could apply the new requirements to public
announcements without any significant burden or delay. However, the requirement could cause
delays in earnings releases for other companies. Although we believe it is in a company’s own
best interests to have the audit committee discussions prior to release of earnings, if
practicable, we understand that will not work for some companies. Therefore, we recommend
that the proposal delete the reference to discussions prior to public announcement.
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\Ne hope that you will find these comments helpful. We would be happy to meet with you to
discuss these comments further.
Respectfully submitted,

COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES REGULATION

By:

Guy P. Lander
Chairman of the Committee

Drafting Committee:
Michael J. Holliday
Gerald S. Backman
Richard E. Gutman
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Donald E. Kiernan
Senior Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer

SBC Communications Inc.
175 E. Houston Street
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Phone 210 351-2200
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SBC
November 29, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:

We have reviewed the exposure drafts of amendments to Auditing Standards Nos.
61 and 71.
We agree with the amendment to Auditing Standard No. 61, which would require
the external auditor to discuss with management and the audit committee their
judgments about the quality and consistency of the client’s accounting principles
and completeness of accounting information. We believe that this is an
appropriate amendment and that it is in the best interest of our shareholders.
However, we recommend that the Board reconsider the proposed amendment to
Auditing Standard No. 71. The amendment would require the external auditor to
discuss with the audit committee or its chairman certain matters that arise from a
review of quarterly financial information prior to its public announcement. It is our
belief that both management and the external auditor have specific responsibilities
on these matters and dedicate appropriate resources in preparing and reviewing
quarterly information. Further, we believe that both management and the external
auditor are expected to inform the audit committee before the public release of
interim financial results if there are any extraordinary issues or disagreements. As
such, we believe that requiring the communications of quarterly financial
information reviews prior to their release is not necessary.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the AlCPA’s proposed
amendments.
Sincerely,

#27
FLORIDA

INSTITUTE

OF

CERTIFIED

PUBLIC

ACCOUNTANTS

325 WEST COLLEGE AVENUE • P.O. BOX 5437 • TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32314
TELEPHONE (850) 224-2727 • FAX (850) 222-8190

November 23, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

RE: Exposure Draft: Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication with Audit Committees and Statement on Auditing Standards No.
71, Interim Financial Information
Dear Ms. Boothe:

The Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee of the Florida Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (the “Committee”) has reviewed and discussed the above
referenced exposure draft. The Committee has the following comments regarding this
exposure draft.
The Committee has some general concerns with these two proposed amendments. The
first concern relates to the appearance that the amendments are shifting responsibility
from management to the auditor. It is management’s responsibility to select appropriate
accounting principles within generally accepted accounting principles and the auditor’s
responsibility to report on the fairness of the financial statements. These proposed
amendments appear to be shifting the burden for the selection of the accounting
principles more toward the direction of the auditor.

The second concern relates to the vagueness of some of the terms used in the proposed
amendments. The Committee had difficulty defining some of the terms such as
representational faithfulness and consequently is unsure as to how to apply them in
practice.
Lastly, the Committee has concerns over the evaluation of the “quality” of an entity’s
accounting measurements and disclosures. Professional literature does not define the term
quality. The Committee would like to see some authoritative guidance given as to how to
define and measure quality.
As always, the Committee appreciates the opportunity to share our views and concerns
and to comment on exposure drafts. Members of the Committee are available to discuss
any questions you may have regarding this communication.

Sincerely,

Joy L. Gibson, CPA
Chairman
FICPA Committee on Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards
Committee members coordinating this response:
Joy L. Gibson, CPA
Robert T. Loverich, CPA
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Chevron
November 23, 1999

Chevron Corporation
575 Market Street

San Francisco, CA 94105-2856

M. R. Klitten

Vice President, Finance

Mr. Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20549-0609

COMMENT: PROPOSED RULE ON AUDIT COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE
FILE No. S7-22-99

Dear Mr. Katz:
On behalf of Chevron Corporation, I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Commission’s
proposed rule on Audit Committee Disclosure.

The positions taken by the Commission in this proposal improve on the Blue Ribbon Committee’s
recommendations in that they are clearer and more pragmatic. However, we wish to comment on two
of the questions raised in the proposed rule.

Section III.A (Pre-Filing Review of Quarterly Financial Statements), discusses the independent
auditor’s SAS 71 interim review. One specific question is:
“Should we require that interim reviews be completed prior to quarterly “earnings releases,” when
a company releases to the public financial results before the Form 10-Q or 10-QSB is filed?”
We believe that it is very much in the interest of the investing public that companies disclose financial
results as soon as possible, which is generally before the 10-Q can be completed. When Chevron
releases earnings, we have completed a management review and our independent auditor has
completed much—but not necessarily all—of its SAS 71 interim review. Holding back public
disclosure of our interim financial results until the final completion of the SAS 71 review (and
discussions with the audit committee or its chair) would not serve the public interest. Any
unnecessary delay in dissemination of financial data would appear to run counter to the Commission’s
public statements.

Consequently, we believe strongly that the SAS 71 interim review should be completed prior to the
filing of the Form 10-Q, but not before the earnings press release is issued.

Mr. Jonathan G. Katz
November 23, 1999
Page 2

Under Section III.E (Proposed Safe Harbors), the proposed rule acknowledges that
“...notwithstanding the audit committee’s critical oversight role of the financial reporting process and
financial statements, management ultimately has responsibility for the company’s financial
statements.” The paragraph goes on to outline how the safe harbors could be applied and we support
this approach.
The paragraph that follows states:

“We request your comments on whether we should adopt these proposed liability “safe harbors” to
cover the information disclosed under the proposed amendments. Is a safe harbor necessary?”

Although management is responsible for the financial statements, with review provided by the
independent auditor, the expanded role of the audit committee could be misinterpreted as more than an
oversight process. The safe harbor language is essential to the goals of frank and honest
communication. If audit committee members are concerned about capricious litigation, it could have
the unintended effect of making them less effective. Moreover, given the importance of having the
very best people serve on the audit committee, anything that acts as a deterrent to full participation
would not further the interests of better financial controls and disclosure.
Therefore, our position is that safe harbors (as described in the second paragraph of Section III.E)
should be applied to all required disclosures.

I appreciate this opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

Attachments:

cc:

Two (2) additional copies

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 228
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

#29
Arthur
Andersen
Arthur Andersen LLP

December 6,1999

33 West Monroe Street
Chicago IL 60603-5385

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

Dear Ms. Boothe:

We are pleased to comment on the proposed amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 61, "Communication with Audit Committees," and SAS No. 71, "Interim Financial
Information," which are the Auditing Standards Board's (ASB's) response to the
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees.

We are generally supportive of the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Committee and amendments
proposed by the ASB. We believe the amendments proposed by the ASB will have a positive
effect on the financial reporting process. Many have viewed Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) as giving companies the freedom to operate within generally accepted
ranges. Historically, a company operating within the range of GAAP, or the accounting
"fairway," is considered acceptable because by definition, no place on the fairway is of higher
quality than any other point. Our experience indicates that most faulty financial reporting
started out on the fairway but veered out of bounds over time. Looking at the direction of a
company's reporting could provide an indication of potentially faulty reporting in the future.
Discussion of reporting quality with the audit committee can identify potential problems before
they occur, particularly when those discussions occur on a quarterly basis. Although generally
supportive of the ASB's proposal, we suggest that the ASB clarify certain items, as discussed
below.

SAS 61
We believe that the ASB has made improvements to the original recommendation suggested by
the BRC, in particular the deletion of the terms aggressive and conservative. However, we still
have some concerns with the proposal. We believe that management, audit committees and
auditors need a common framework for assessing reporting quality. Absent that framework,
there is a risk that the players will talk past each other with competing definitions of reporting

Arthur

ANDERSEN
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Page 2

November 3,1999

quality. We understand that the development of this framework will not be easy and will take
some time. As a result, we support the ASB's current proposal as logical first step in the
process. We strongly encourage the ASB and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
to provide further guidance in the future regarding an objective quality reporting framework.
Once this framework is developed, we believe that the prohibition on communicating this
discussion in writing should be deleted, as further discussed below.

With regard to the current wording of the proposal, we are also troubled that the proposal does
not distinguish "quality" from "preferability." We suggest that the ASB address this issue in
the final rules. At a minimum, we believe the ASB should add a footnote to the word "quality"
that explains that "quality" does not carry the same meaning as "preferability," as the latter is
used in Accounting Principles Bulletin No. 20.
The ASB acknowledges that "objective criteria have not been developed to aid in the consistent
evaluation of the quality of an entity's accounting measurements and disclosures." For this
reason, the ASB prohibits the auditor from communicating this quality discussion in writing.
We agree that a written communication should never take the place of the discussion with the
audit committee. The intent of the BRC's recommendation was to encourage an open and frank
discussion regarding the subjective nature of a company's financial reporting. This could not be
achieved through a one-way written communication. Nevertheless, we are troubled by a
prohibition on summarizing the nature of the discussion in writing after the meeting has
occurred. We foresee audit committees requesting such a summary and believe it would place
auditors in an awkward position to refuse such a request. In addition, if a framework were
developed by the ASB and FASB in the future, we believe this prohibition should be deleted
altogether. We also suggest that a sentence be added to the proposal instructing the auditor to
carefully review any minutes or other writings resulting from the meeting prepared by the
audit committee or management to ensure that the writings are consistent with the auditors'
understanding of what was communicated.
While the ASB attempted to provide examples of matters to be discussed with audit
committees, we observe that many of these examples are matters already required to be
discussed with audit committees. The current text of AU Section 380 requires discussion with
audit committees concerning the selection of accounting policies, estimates and judgements. It
is unclear whether the ASB had something different in mind by repeating these aspects of the
required communication. In addition, we also note that proposed wording of the amendment
discusses the "consistency of the entity's accounting information contained in the financial
statements" twice. It is unclear whether the ASB had two different thoughts in mind, whether
it was emphasizing consistency or whether the repetition was an oversight. We suggest that
each of these items be clarified in the final amendment.

Arthur
Andersen
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Page 3
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The ASB's proposal indicates that the quality reporting discussion would generally include
management as an active participant. However, the wording proposed by the ASB could be
interpreted to mean that the auditor should not have this discussion privately with the audit
committee if the Committee so requests. We agree that that the ideal approach is to involve
management, auditors and the audit committee in the discussion. The interaction of all the
parties helps to assure that all relevant information is considered in the discussion. However,
we see no basis for refusing a request by an audit committee to have this discussion without
management. In fact, there may be circumstances where it is appropriate to conduct this
discussion privately. We do not believe that the auditing profession is in a position to tell the
audit committee how to execute their responsibility. As a result, we recommend that the ASB
delete this sentence or clarify in the final amendment that auditors are not precluded from
having this discussion privately with the audit committee.

SAS 71

We agree with the general concept of auditors communicating with audit committees prior to
the public release of interim results and prior to the filing of interim results with a regulator
agency (e.g. Form 10-Q filed with the SEC). We would like to point out, however, that this
practice is inconsistent with the current requirement regarding communications for annual
audit results. In fact, paragraph 4 of AU Section 380 specifically states that auditors are not
required to communicate the results of the audit with the audit committee prior to the filing of
the financial statements. We recommend that ASB require this communication with the audit
committees prior to the filing of the annual financial statements and prior to the public release
of the annual results. In fact, given the higher level of assurance associated with the annual
audited information, it would seem to be even more important to communicate with audit
committees prior to the release of annual information.
We would be please to discuss any of our comments with you or your staff at your convenience.
If you have any questions, please contact Dorsey Baskin at 312-931-2238.
Very truly yours,

AICPA
December 14, 1999

File Ref. Nos. 1120
2280

To the Auditing Standards Board:

Here are the comment letters received to date on the proposed Statement on Auditing
Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication
with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial
Information.

Name/Affiliation

Location

30. Jacob A. Azar, CPA, Chairman
Massachusetts Society of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc.

Boston, MA

31. Loretta V. Cangialosi
Pfizer Inc.

New York, NY

32. Margaret M. Foran
Michael J. Holliday
Kathleen A. Weigand
American Society of Corporate
Secretaries, Inc.

New York, NY

33. Susan Koski-Grafer
Financial Executives Institute

Morristown, NJ

34. KPMG LLP

New York, NY

35. Kathy A. Asbeck
Coming Incorporated

Coming, NY

If you have any questions, please call me at 212/596-6026.
Sincerely,

Kim Gibson
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
Enclosures
cc: Audit Committee Effectiveness Task Force
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 • (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213 • www.aicpa.org

ISO9001 Certified
The CPA. . Never Underestimate The Value.®
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Massachusetts Society of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
Educational Foundation

105 Chauncy Street • Boston, Massachusetts 02111

November 30, 1999

Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards - AICPA
File 2280
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

Re:

Exposure Draft Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards - “Amendments
to SAS No. 61 and No. 71”

Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Procedures Committee is the senior technical
committee of the Massachusetts Society of Certified Public Accountants. The Committee
consists of over thirty members who are affiliated with public accounting firms of various
sizes, from sole proprietorships to international “big five” firms, as well as members in
both industry and academia. The Committee has reviewed and discussed the abovementioned Exposure Draft. The views expressed in this comment letter are solely those
of the Committee and do not reflect the views of the organizations with which the
Committee members are affiliated.

In response to the proposed amendments to SAS No. 61, we have concerns regarding the
use of the word “quality” within this document and the proposed requirements that we
speak to a degree of quality of accounting principles applied. The acceptability of
accounting principles applied in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles is not subject to a quality assessment. We already have guidelines pertaining
to possible alternatives under GAAP, and that entities should follow “preferable”
methods of GAAP if there is more than one alternative. In other words, GAAP is GAAP
and any principle applied, which is outside of the scope of generally accepted accounting
principles is, in fact, not acceptable.

6 1 7.556.4000 • Fax 617.556.4 1 26 • Toll Free 1.800.392.61 45
www.MSCPAonline.org • E-mail: MSCPA@MSCPAonline.org

Massachusetts Society of
Certified Public Accountants., Inc.
Educational Foundation

105 Chauncy Street • Boston, Massachusetts 02111

Page Two
November 30, 1999

In regards to the requirement under the proposed amendments to SAS No. 71, we have
significant concern over the possible misinterpretation as to the scope of the quarterly
review required under SAS No. 71. Additionally, we suggest that consideration be given
to the additional costs to the registrant resulting from such meetings, keeping in mind that
these communications are already required under SAS No. 61 on an annual basis.
Finally, we have concern in regards to the time constraints placed upon the proposed
quarterly communications and suggest that the requirements that such communications
take place before the press release puts undue pressure on the process of timely issuance
of quarterly information.
We appreciate the opportunity to present our comments and thank you for your
consideration.

Very truly yours,

Jacob A. Azar, CPA, Chairman
Accounting Principles and Auditing
Procedures Committee
i

Massachusetts Society of Certified Public
Accountants

6 1 7.556.4000 • Fax 6 1 7.556.41 26 • Toll Free 1.800.392.61 45

www.MSCPAonline.org • E-moil: MSCPA@MSCPAonline.org

Corporate Finance
Pfizer Inc
235 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017-5755
Tel 212 573 3222 Fax 212 338 1815
Email loretta.v.cangialosi@pfizer.com

November 30,1999
Loretta Cangialosi

AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775

Vice President and Controller
Accounting Services

Attention: Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
Re: File 2280

Ladies and Gentlemen:
Thank you for allowing Pfizer the opportunity to respond to the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards
“Amendments to SAS 61, Communicationwith Audit Committees and SAS 71, Interim Financial Information.”
Pfizer is a research-based global pharmaceutical company that discovers, develops, manufactures, and markets
innovative medicines for humans and animals. For 1998, total revenues and assets exceeded $13 billion and $18
billion, respectively.

Part 1 Communication with Audit Committees - While our comments in the attached response will more completely
express our views, in summary, we do not support the recommendations contained in Part 1 concerning
communications with the audit committee. We believe strongly that the auditor’s judgments should be restricted to
issues of ‘acceptability.’ However, in recognition of the concerns expressed by the SEC and the AICPA, we have
proposed an alternative solution that would permit the auditor to hold these proposed discussions, but only under
certain very restrictive circumstances.
Part 2 Interim Financial Information - We support the recommendations contained in Part 2 concerning interim
financial statements, and have, in fact, already instituted such a process for Pfizer’s interim financial statements.

We would be happy to discuss our views with your staff.
Respectfully,

J
Loretta V. Cangialosi
Vice President and Controller
Pfizer Inc
Enclosure (1)

cc: Mr. David Shedlarz
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Pfizer Inc
Response to the Auditing Standards Board regarding the
Exposure Draft on Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards
“Amendments to SAS 61, Communication with Audit Committees and SAS 71, Interim
Financial Information”

Part 1 - Communication with Audit Committees

Following are the recommendations contained in this part of the proposed Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS):
Auditor’s Judgments About the Quality of the Entity’s Accounting Principles: In
connection with each SEC engagement the auditor should discuss with the audit
committee the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of
the entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. Since the
primary responsibility for establishing an entity’s accounting principles rests with
management, the discussion generally would include management as an active
participant. The discussion should include such matters as the consistency of
application of the entity’s accounting policies and the clarity, consistency, and
completeness of the entity’s accounting information contained in the financial
statements and related disclosures. The discussion should also include items that
have a significant impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability,
neutrality, and consistency of the accounting information included in the financial
statements. Examples of items that may have such impact are the following:

Selection of new or changes to accounting policies
Estimates, judgments and uncertainties
Unusual transactions
Accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, including
the timing of transactions and the period in which they are recorded

The discussion should be tailored to the entity’s specific circumstances, including
accounting applications and practices not explicitly addressed in the accounting
literature, for example, those that may be unique to an industry. Objective criteria
have not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of the quality of an
entity’s accounting measurements and disclosures. Given this lack of objective
criteria and to facilitate an open and frank discussion, the auditor’s judgments
should not be communicated in writing. As a result, the auditor need only
document in the working papers that the discussion has taken place, the date of
the discussion, and the participants.

General

We note that management is responsible for the fair presentation of the financial statements and
while that the auditor is responsible for expressing an opinion on the fair presentation of the
financial statements taken as a whole. We are generally concerned with proposals that threaten
this division of established responsibility. As such, we believe that continues to be appropriate for
auditors to be restricted to issues that affect fair presentation only; in other words, issues of
‘acceptability.’
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However, we understand and agree with the concerns expressed by the Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission- - that there are registrants who abuse, and have abused,
acceptable accounting and disclosure practices even within the confines of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). It is with respect to those concerns that we appreciate the
motivation behind this proposed SAS.
Notwithstanding those motives, we also know that there is no evidence that suggests that ‘audit
failures’ result from acceptable accounting principles being applied in a company’s financial
reporting. Absent fraud, audit failures occur as a result of unacceptable accounting principles
being applied in a company’s financial reporting. For this reason, we believe that the auditors
should focus their efforts on issues of acceptability.’
Further, while the proposed SAS would require that these conversations become a part of the
routine audit process, we believe that these conversations should deal with abuse only. The
recommendations of the Auditing Standards Board (ASB or the Board) unnecessarily
compromise the division of responsibility between management and the auditor. We believe that,
except under the most restrictive of circumstances, the auditor should focus his attention on
matters of acceptability and allow management to focus on policy.

Concerns about inherent subjectivity
The proposed SAS requires a discussion about the “quality, not just the acceptability” of
accounting principles as applied in the company’s financial reporting. Discussions about the
‘quality' of anything are, by nature, highly judgmental. These conversations would be inherently
subjective and variable.

We believe that the ASB recognizes, to a degree, this fact, as it states that “objective criteria have
not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of the quality of an entity’s accounting
measurement and disclosures.” We believe that the ASB hasn’t developed objective criteria
because it simply cannot be done. The content and nature of these discussions will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each individual situation and will likely be highly influenced by the
personalities and experiences of the auditor and the members of the audit committee. These
concerns, coupled with the fact that management is responsible for the fair presentation of the
financial statements, cause us to believe that these conversations, as envisioned by the proposed
SAS, are inappropriate.
Equally disturbing to us is the fact that in response to these concerns and difficulties about
subjectivity, the ASB has concluded, “the auditor’s judgments should not be communicated in
writing.” Moreover, on October 6, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed
rules that would require companies to include in their proxy statements a report from the audit
committee to state that the committee is not aware of any material modifications to the financial
statements that are necessary. We believe that this approach of oral communication will only
serve to make the required communications mysterious in addition to variable and inappropriate.

Concerns about management’s authority
As stated, we are generally and increasingly concerned about proposals that threaten
management’s authority over the financial statements. While this authority is bounded by GAAP,
there is still tremendous decision-making latitude inherent in a set of financial statements— from
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the selection of accounting policies to the development of estimates and assumptions that affect
reported amounts and disclosures. This is clearly identified in the ‘summary of significant
accounting policies’ included in the footnotes to financial statements. Management bears this
responsibility and must be free to exercise it. In fact, no one else is in a better position to make
these decisions.

Even assuming that the auditor has deemed management’s decisions ‘acceptable,’ and that the
auditor can render a clean opinion, the proposed SAS would require the auditor to take an
additional step, and render another annual opinion (to the audit committee) about the “quality” of
management’s decisions. These ‘routine conversations’ will serve to undercut the authority of
management and to further triangulate the audit process even in situations where there is no
documented abuse. This routine challenge to management’s authority is not necessary or
prudent.
Alternative Proposal

As we see it, there are two competing objectives that must be achieved: (1) safeguard
management’s authority over the financial statements and (2) safeguard high quality financial
reporting. To accomplish both objectives, we believe that the auditor’s judgments about the
quality of management’s decision should be rendered to the audit committee only in the most
egregious of circumstances— that is, circumstances in which there is a compelling, documented
history of abuse. As such, these conversations should not be held as a routine part of the audit.
Further, we recommend that, when and if such conversations take place, the auditor be required
to present these judgments in writing.

A requirement that the judgments be presented in writing will put tremendous pressure on the
auditor to ensure that those judgments that are communicated to the audit committee are fully
supported by the most objective means available. Before communicating negative judgments
about the quality of management’s decisions, the auditor will have to ensure that there is
compelling evidence of a recurring pattern of ‘poor quality’ decision-making. And, that such a
pattern can be documented. Further, we believe that the requirement of a written document will
ensure that the judgments of a sole auditor will not prevail. The documentation will have to be
sufficient to convince the primary engagement team as well as the concurring partner.

While we understand that the ASB wants to encourage open and frank discussion, we want to
ensure that such discussions are particularly focused on substantively abusive cases and that the
conversations, if held, are serious, deliberate, supported, and put in writing.
Our objectives in placing such judgments into written form are to ensure that these
communications are not impulsive and to protect management, the auditor and the audit
committee from any misunderstandings in the future about what was communicated and when.
This assurance will become especially important if the SEC approves its recently proposed rules
that will require the audit committee to communicate in writing to the shareholders that
discussions have taken place with the auditor.
Conclusion

Based on the above, we cannot support the provisions of Part 1 Communications with Audit
Committees as presented. Management must maintain its clear responsibility for the financial
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statements, within the confines of GAAP, and auditors should be restricted to matters of
acceptability only, which is their assigned role under SAS No. 1. Conversations about the ‘quality’
of management’s decisions should not become a routine aspect of the audit process because of
the detrimental impact such conversations will have on the actual and perceived authority of
management over the financial statements.
The impact of the proposal as drafted will have the auditors become de facto advisors to the audit
committee on what are the appropriate acceptable policies that should be followed by the
company. This contemplated role is clearly outside the boundaries of what an auditor has been
engaged to do. We refer to AU Section 110.02 which states that “[rnjanagement is responsible for
adopting sound accounting policies ...” and “[t]he independent auditor may make suggestions
about the form or content of the financial statements... based on information from management’s
accounting system. However, the auditor’s responsibility for the financial statements he has
audited is confined to the expression of his opinion on them.” We also concerned about the
proposal usurping the ability of management to select practices if audit committees attempt to
limit liability or limit potential negative discussions by having the auditors select the policies to be
used in the preparation of the financial statements. Please understand that we are not attempting
to be alarmist in this regard as we have heard of law firms advising audit committees to not accept
any waived adjustments in order to avoid any Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 issues.

We believe that such conversations should only occur only in cases where there is a compelling
history of abuse. Further, if and when the conversations do occur, they should be documented in
writing for the protection of management, the auditor and the audit committee.

Part 2- Interim Financial Information
Following are the recommendations contained in this part:
When the accountant has conducted the review prior to the entity’s filing of the interim
financial information with a regulatory agency (such as the SEC), he or she should
attempt to make such communications with the audit committee, or at least its chairman,
and a representative of financial management prior to such filing. If the entity intends to
release interim financial information in a public announcement prior to such filing, the
accountant should attempt to make such communications prior to such public
announcement. If such communications are not made prior to the public announcement
or filing, as applicable, they should be made as soon as practicable in the circumstances.

We agree with the proposal as presented and, in fact, have already adopted a similar policy at
Pfizer.
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AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CORPORATE SECRETARIES, INC.
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10175

December 8, 1999

AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
E-mail address: sboothe@aicpa.org
Attention: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards

Re:

Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Securities Law Committee of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (the
“Society”) is pleased to provide comments to the AICPA on its proposed amendments to
SAS 61 and SAS 71 (the “Proposal”). The Society, with more than 4,000 members,
represents over 2,700 public companies. We believe that our members, who serve as
the interface between management, the company’s directors and its shareholders, are
in a unique position to provide insight and discerning perspectives on the issues raised
in the Proposal.
The Proposal arises out of the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (“BRC
Recommendations”), and are part of a three-pronged approach for implementation
by the AICPA, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and stock exchanges.
The Proposal, plus the separate, companion rule proposals of the Commission and
the stock exchanges, represent an ambitious undertaking to implement the BRC
Recommendations. The general stated objective to make audit committees more
effective is one that the Society and its members can support. Our comments are
directed to how to best accomplish that objective.

1.

SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.

The proposal would add a requirement that the auditor discuss the following
information relating to the auditor’s judgments about the “quality,” not just the
acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles with the audit committee,
including matters such as:

a.
b.

c.

consistency of application of accounting policies
clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information
contained in the financial statements and related disclosures
items that have a significant impact on the representational
faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of the
accounting information included in the financial statements,
including, for example:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

selection of new or changes to accounting policies
estimates, judgments and uncertainties
unusual transactions
accounting policies relating to significant financial
statement items, including the timing of transactions and
the period in which they are recorded

Auditors would be prohibited from communicating in writing the above judgments.
The discussion would be documented in the audit working papers.

The Society does not oppose specificity about items to be discussed by the auditors with
the audit committee, provided that the items are related to the application of
accounting principles to the company’s financial reporting, and have an objective
meaning with established standards. For example, the Society agrees with discussion
about:
•
•
•

•

consistency of application of accounting policies
consistency and completeness of accounting information
the following items where they have a significant effect on the
financial statements:
selection of new or changes to accounting policies
estimates, judgments and uncertainties
unusual transactions
accounting policies relating to significant financial statement
items, including the timing of transactions and the period in which
they are recorded

The Society, however, strongly opposes the requirement to discuss the “quality” not just
the acceptability of the company’s accounting principles.
Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard for Generally
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Accepted Auditing Standards and financial statement reporting . The Proposal would
introduce “quality” and other theoretical concepts that were intended to be tools to
guide the Financial Accounting Standards Board in developing accounting and
reporting standards.** The concepts have no established objective standards. The
AICPA itself recognizes in the Proposal that there are no objective criteria for “quality.”
In fact, in part because of the lack of criteria, the Proposal prohibits the auditor from
communicating its judgments about “quality” in writing. In light of this, there can be
no valid basis to subject companies and their audit committees to a requirement to
discuss, and possibly be subject to, claims that they are responsible for, non-existent
standards for financial statements. This aspect of the Proposal, if adopted, can only
have the effect of creating potential litigation and liability, and discouraging qualified
directors from serving on audit committees.
Accordingly, we urge that the words “the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not
just the acceptability, of’ and the terms “clarity,” “representational faithfulness,” and
“neutrality” be deleted from proposed subsection .11 of SAS 61 (AU sec. 380.11).
Finally, if the above changes are made, the last three sentences of proposed subsection
.11, dealing with the lack of objective criteria and the prohibition on written
communications, would appear unnecessary and can be deleted.
2.

SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.

SAS 71 would be amended to require* the auditors to have the SAS 61 discussions
(presently required only for annual audits) in connection with a review of interim
financials. Specifically,

a.

SAS 61 Discussion. The auditor would have to communicate to the audit
committee, or be satisfied through discussions with the audit committee
that management communicated to the committee, matters described in
SAS 61 that have been identified in the conduct of the interim financial
review.

We generally support the proposal requiring a discussion of SAS 61 information that
has been identified related to interim financial statements, but only if the content and
extent of the SAS 61 information does not expand beyond the current Proposal modified

* Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information (May 1980).
* We note that SAS 71 as proposed to be amended appears to require auditor review prior to filing
the Form 10-Q (or 10-QSR), only if any SAS 61 items are identified. In other words, if the company
chooses to have its auditors do a SAS 61 review for the interim financial statements as well as the
annual financials, then the auditors would be required to attempt to have a SAS 71 discussion prior
to filing the form 10-Q. However, if the SEC’s companion proposals (Release No. 34-41987; October
7, 1999) are adopted as proposed, SEC-reporting companies would be required to have the SAS 71
discussion/review prior to filing the Form 10-Q (or 10-QSB).
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in accordance with our comments above, including elimination of the requirement to
discuss the “quality” of accounting principles.
We believe that such discussions can be helpful in ensuring that quarterly financial
statements are reliable and credible. Interim reviews also can relieve some of the
burden and time pressure of the year-end audit, as auditors will already be conversant
with many of the significant issues expected to arise on the year-end audit.

Many of our larger corporate members already engage in SAS 61 type discussions with
their auditors in connection with their interim financial statements. For those
companies, the proposed SAS 71 requirement for interim SAS 61 discussions should not
introduce any significant cost increases or other burdens.
In addition, we understand that the major accounting firms are in most cases now
requiring such reviews as a condition to acceptance of new audit engagements. Thus,
for many companies, the proposal will not add significantly to the burden and expense
of auditor reviews. For those companies whose auditors do not now perform SAS 61type reviews on interim financial statements, it should be recognized that the
requirement will add additional cost and delays in release of interim financial
statements.

In trying to devise a proposal that would provide the benefits of interim discussions
without unduly burdening those companies who presently do not have such a
procedure, we believe the best approach would be to defer the effectiveness of the
proposed amendment to SAS 71 to interim periods in fiscal years ending on or after
December 15, 2001.
Earlier application should, of course, be permitted and
recommended. This would allow one year for the companies to develop procedures,
schedule audit committee meetings, establish internal review timetables, and make the
other necessary arrangements to implement the new requirements. In any event, the
currently proposed effective date would apply to first calendar quarter 2000 interim
financial statements for calendar year companies, a very tight time period under the
best of circumstances. Finally, the AICPA should consider an exemption or extended
phase-in period for small businesses.

b.

Timing of Interim Financial Review Discussions. The auditor would be
required to attempt to discuss the SAS 61 matters with the audit committee
or at least the committee chairperson, and a representative of financial
management, prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q and, if possible, prior to a
public announcement of interim financial results.

We support the principles that the independent auditor have timely access to the audit
committee, or at least the chair of the committee, and company financial management to
discuss SAS 61 matters identified with respect to interim financial statements prior to
filing the Form 10-Q or 10-QSB. We have some concerns, however, with the proposed
amendment to SAS 71, particularly as it applies to public announcements of interim
results.
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With respect to SAS 61 discussions prior to public announcement of results, we believe that
some of our larger company’s members already have such discussions. The new
requirement would not impose any significant burden or delay on them. With respect to
other companies, the requirement could lead to delays in earnings releases which work to
the disadvantage of investors and create the conditions under which inadvertent leaks may
occur. While it is preferable to have the audit committee discussions prior to release of
earnings, it may not be practicable for some companies for a variety of reasons. Among
other things, many companies may not have their full financial statements completed at
the time they announce earnings. The Society proposes that the requirement regarding
discussions prior to public announcement be modified to be a recommended best practice,
and that SAS 61 clarify that companies are not required to delay the timing of their
earnings releases or take on additional burdens in order to have the discussion with the
audit committee (or chair) prior to the release of earnings.
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The Society appreciates this opportunity to comment on the Proposal. Please let us know if
you have any questions on our views.

Sincerely,

/s/ MARGARET M. FORAN

Margaret M. Foran
Chair
Securities Law Committee

/s/ MICHAEL J. HOLLIDAY

Michael J. Holliday
Co-Chair
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force

/s/ KATHLEEN A. WEIGAND

Kathleen A. Weigand
Co-Chair
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force
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FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES
INSTITUTE

December 10 1999

Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Reference: File 2280

Dear Ms. Boothe:

The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of the Financial Executives Institute
appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement on
Auditing Standards Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71,
Interim Financial Information. FEI has long been a supporter of high quality financial
reporting and of informed and vigilant audit committees.

CCR has two general comments with regard to the exposure draft. First, it is difficult to
assess the necessity of the actions this ED proposes because any subsequent review of
effectiveness will be virtually impossible. While the Blue Ribbon Committee (“BRC”)
made no case to establish a causal relationship between the problem and the proposed
solution, CCR believes that the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), as the auditing
governing body, should have a higher justification standard for issuing new procedures.
The ASB has an obligation to issue only relevant standards.
Consider, for example, the proposal to have the auditor attempt to discuss with the audit
committee the matters described in SAS No. 61 prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q or, if
applicable, prior to a public announcement of interim financial reporting. For this to be a
relevant standard, one needs to believe that a reason audit committees arc ineffective is
that auditors arc aware of information about material misstatements of interim financial
information and that they choose to keep it from the audit committee or are prohibited
from bringing it to them. CCR is hard pressed to believe that either scenario is a
prevalent problem that necessitates this solution. If the real issue is that some auditors
may lack the independence to surface material problems within the communication
framework in existing auditing standards or lack the competence to distinguish material
from immaterial issues, then a different solution is required. Again, the exposure draft
requires more transparency into the ASB’s notions of how this proposal accomplishes the
objective of improved governance set out by the BRC.
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The second general comment relates to mandating best practices in a one-sizc-fits-all
approach, Our experience is that audit committees, as committees of the board of
directors, have virtually unlimited authority to request information from management and
the auditors. For example, if an audit committee felt it was important to its charter to
have every audit difference over a dollar reported to it, then it is clearly within its power
to do so. Promulgating standards which force reporting of information not otherwise
requested serves purposes other than improving the audit committee function.
Some of the proposals in the ED, such as an annual three-way discussion of the quality of
the financial reporting, would likely find a consensus as a best practice. Other items may
not find that consensus. If you view, as we do, that the audit committee’s role is to
provide oversight of the control framework that leads to quality financial reporting, then
it should be up to the audit committee to determine the communication with the
independent auditor best suited for its circumstances. For example, take the case of the
aforementioned interim financial reporting. If the audit committee is concerned about
interim misstatements, then it is clearly within their purview to require meetings with the
auditors prior to public release of information. If the audit committee views the risks as
low due to their assessment of the control environment, then how docs requiring
communication possibly meet the cost benefit threshold the ASB claims to apply to
standard setting.

Our detailed responses on specific issues raised in the ED are discussed below.

Limiting the Scope of the Amendments to Audits of SEC Clients
CCR disagrees with the limitation of this standard to SEC registrant engagements only.
Foremost, it seems inappropriate to withhold whatever value is created by CPA firms
through this standard from the boards of client companies that arc not registrants.
Secondly, it is unclear to us how users, especially non-owners, of audited financial
statements will be able to discern what an audit opinion stands for if auditing standards
differ based on who provides capital.
Requiring Discussion of Quality of Accounting Practices with Audit Committee

It is CCR’s position that the marketplace will decide what communications are necessary
in any specific circumstance, especially when the audit committee has unlimited authority
to request information. However, we agree that a discussion between management, the
auditor and the audit committee is a best practice that should be encouraged. We
especially appreciate that the ASB modified the original BRC proposal to include
management in such a discussion. We believe that the ASB should define quality and
explicitly distinguish this communication from a preferability option.

Prohibiting Written Communication
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Prohibiting Written Communication

While CCR definitely feels that written communication should not be mandated, we arc
curious as to how the effectiveness of audit committees is enhanced by prohibiting
auditors from responding to a request from audit committees to document their views,
Distinguishing between a written communication and documentation of an oral
communication in meeting minutes seems slight at best. Presumably an important
takeaway from the contemplated discussion is whether the quality of accounting
decisions change over time. In periods of audit committee member turnover some audit
committees may deem it desirable to maintain a written record in order make such an
assessment.
Audit Committee Communication Prior to Release of Interim Financial Information

For the reasons indicated above, CCR strongly opposes making such a communication
mandatory. While still questioning its necessity given the authority vested in audit
committees and existing auditing standards on management fraud, CCR would not object
to the amendment were it changed to require communication only when required
adjustments to interim financial information were not reflected. We suggest that the ASB
perform further research as to the likelihood of false positive conclusions from such a
communication given the limited scope of interim reviews.

*

*

*

*

The CCR committee member that coordinated this response is Stephen F. Reeves of The
Black & Decker Corporation. Should you have any questions, please contact him at
(410)716-2118.
Sincerely,

Susan Koski-Grafer
Vice President - Technical Activities
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December 9, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

Dear Ms. Boothe:
We are pleased to comment on the American Institute of Certified Public Accountant’s (AICPA)
proposed amendments to Statement on Auditing Standard No. 61 (SAS 61), Communication with Audit
Committees and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71 (SAS 71), Interim Financial Information.

We commend the AICPA and the Blue Ribbon Committee for their efforts to enhance the effectiveness of
audit committees. Our goals as independent auditors and the goals of audit committees are closely
aligned - quality financial reporting for the benefit of investors and other stakeholders. We are highly
supportive of the current audit committee initiatives and believe many of the proposals will result in
stronger audit committees, benefits to shareholders and an enhanced audit profession.
Generally we support the proposed amendments; specific comments are included in the attachment to this
letter.

KPMG is committed to enhancing the effectiveness of audit committees and has launched the KPMG
Audit Committee Institute to help management and directors understand the evolving issues relating to
corporate governance and the audit committee function. We will be pleased to discuss our comments, if
you have any questions on these or other matters related to this issue. Please contact Andy Capelli at
(212) 909-5474.
Very truly yours,

Attachment
Amendment to SAS 61, Communication with Audit Committees.

We concur with the proposed amendment and believe that it addresses the spirit of the Blue Ribbon
Committee recommendations. We agree that such communication should be oral, and not written, to
facilitate an open and frank exchange of views between management, the audit committee and the auditor.
Further, due to the subjectivity of the matter, each auditor needs to clarify that the assessments represent
their own personal views.
We suggest that the AICPA consider including in the final amendment a modification to paragraph .13 of
SAS 61. The paragraph currently states: “The auditor should discuss with the audit committee any major
issues that were discussed with management in connection with initial or recurring retention of the auditor
including, among other matters, any discussions regarding the application of accounting principles and
auditing standards.” This implies that management acted on its own to engage the auditors. In light of
recent proposed exchange rules requiring charters that specify auditor accountability to the audit
committee, consideration should be given to amending this paragraph to indicate that the audit committee
or the board of directors, and not management, is responsible for the selection, evaluation and retention or
replacement of the auditors.

Amendment to SAS 71, Interim Financial Information.

We concur with this proposed amendment. We agree that the results of the interim review procedures
should drive the form, content and timing of the auditors communications with the audit committee.
Matters of significance should be brought to the attention of the audit committee prior to the filing of
Form 10-Q and ideally prior to any earnings release.

Corning Incorporated
Corning, New York 14831
607-974-9000

Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
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Dear Ms. Boothe,
I have reviewed the Exposure Draft of a proposed Statement on Auditing Standards titled
Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit
Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information, and
appreciate the opportunity to present my views. While I support some of the proposed changes, I
do have reservations about others.

Open and honest communication between management, the audit committee and the auditor is
undeniably important to the financial reporting process. As such, I support the proposed changes
to SAS 61 as I believe it will encourage continued open communication between management,
the audit committee and the auditor. I also believe that this level of communication currently
exists in most large companies today. Additionally, I agree that it is important that the
discussion as to the quality, not just the acceptability, of the financial reporting not be in writing.
Requiring such communication to be done in writing may create boilerplate presentations that
would not promote open and frank discussions.
Timely and accurate quarterly results are unquestionably important to investors. I do support the
proposed SEC requirement for a SAS 71 review to be performed quarterly for public companies.
However, I disagree with the ASB proposal that the auditor should discuss with the audit
committee the results of such a review prior to the filing of the form 10 Q, or the release of
financial information to the public. I believe strongly that management is responsible for the
financial statements and the overall control environment and that the role of the audit committee
is one of oversight. Management is also responsible for the release of earnings and I believe it is
the discretion of each audit committee to determine its level of comfort with management’s
processes. I do not think it is the role of the audit profession to mandate audit committee
involvement in quarterly financial reporting.

There are also logistical obstacles related to this particular proposal. As companies strive to
minimize the time between financial closing and public announcement of results, this proposal
could result in extending this time period. Extending this time and/or sharing financial
information with outside directors at non-company locations introduces security concerns over
that information shared.

That said, I emphatically support the idea that the outside auditor should have unrestricted access
to the audit committee and it’s chairman. In certain situations, the company may desire to
discuss material transactions or complex accounting issues with the outside auditors. If
management and the outside auditors do not agree on the accounting treatment for these
situations, the outside auditor should have free access to the audit committee or the chair of the
audit committee to discuss such differences of opinion. However, the need and timing of these
discussions should be at the discretion of management, the audit committee, and the outside
auditor.
If you would like to discuss any of these comments further, please call me at (607) 974-8242.
Sincerely,

Kathy A. Asbeck

December 7, 1999

California
Society

Certified
Public
Accountants

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775

Reference:

Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards
Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards Nos. 61 & 71

Dear Ms. Boothe:

The Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee of the California
Society of Certified Public Accountants (AP&AS Committee) has discussed the above
referenced exposure draft and has comments on it.
The AP&AS Committee is the senior technical committee of our state society. The
Committee is composed of 39 members, of whom 12 percent are from national CPA
firms, 53 percent are from local or regional firms, 18 percent are sole practitioners in
public practice, 8 percent are in industry and 3 percent are in academia.

It is the opinion of the Committee that the statement should not be issued. The
Committee believes that SAS’s 61 and 71 in their present form provide adequate
guidance. The Committee also believes that the action expected by the SEC in
response to the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations further obviates the need
for the proposed amendment.
Should the Auditing Standards Board feel compelled to issue the proposed
amendment, the Committee believes that the following points should be addressed:

■

Part 1, paragraph 11 of the draft speaks of the “quality” of an entity’s
accounting principles. The Committee had trouble defining quality in the
context of accounting principles and felt that absent further guidance, the
intended goal of this amendment might not be achieved.

■

Part 1 of the draft also discusses documentation. It is unclear to the AP&AS
Committee if the auditor is precluded from documenting the full text of their
discussion with the audit committee. Some AP&AS Committee members felt
that it was not in the best interest of the practitioner to preclude documentation
of the topics and recommendations discussed.

Ms. Sherry Boothe
AICPA
December 7, 1999
Page 2

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this proposed statement. Please let us know if
you have any questions or require additional information.
Very truly yours,
Accounting Principles and Auditing
Standards Committee

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF

A S C S
CORPORATE SECRETARIES

December 8, 1999

AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
E-mail address: sboothe@aicpa.org
Attention: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards

Re:

Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication
With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim
Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Securities Law Committee of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (the “Society”) is
pleased to provide comments to the AICPA on its proposed amendments to SAS 61 and SAS 71
(the “Proposal”). The Society, with more than 4,000 members, represents over 2,700 public
companies. We believe that our members, who serve as the interface between management, the
company’s directors and its shareholders, are in a unique position to provide insight and discerning
perspectives on the issues raised in the Proposal.
The Proposal arises out of the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (“BRC Recommendations”), and
are part of a three-pronged approach for implementation by the AICPA, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and stock exchanges.
The Proposal, plus the separate, companion rule proposals of the Commission and the stock
exchanges, represent an ambitious undertaking to implement the BRC Recommendations. The
general stated objective to make audit committees more effective is one that the Society and its
members can support. Our comments are directed to how to best accomplish that objective.
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1.

SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.

The proposal would add a requirement that the auditor discuss the following information relating to
the auditor’s judgments about the “quality,” not just the acceptability, of the company’s
accounting principles with the audit committee, including matters such as:

a.
b.
c.

consistency of application of accounting policies
clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information
contained in the financial statements and related disclosures
items that have a significant impact on the representational faithfulness,
verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of the accounting information
included in the financial statements, including, for example:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

selection of new or changes to accounting policies
estimates, judgments and uncertainties
unusual transactions
accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items,
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they are
recorded

Auditors would be prohibited from communicating in writing the above judgments. The discussion
would be documented in the audit working papers.

The Society does not oppose specificity about items to be discussed by the auditors with the audit
committee, provided that the items are related to the application of accounting principles to the
company’s financial reporting, and have an objective meaning with established standards. For
example, the Society agrees with discussion about:
•
•
•

•

consistency of application of accounting policies
consistency and completeness of accounting information
the following items where they have a significant effect on the financial
statements:
selection of new or changes to accounting policies
estimates, judgments and uncertainties
unusual transactions
accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items,
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they are
recorded

The Society, however, strongly opposes the requirement to discuss the “quality” not just the
acceptability of the company’s accounting principles. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard for Generally Accepted Auditing Standards and
financial statement reporting . The Proposal would introduce “quality” and other theoretical
concepts that were intended to be tools to guide the Financial Accounting Standards Board in
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developing accounting and reporting standards.* The concepts have no established objective
standards. The AICPA itself recognizes in the Proposal that there are no objective criteria for
“quality.” In fact, in part because of the lack of criteria, the Proposal prohibits the auditor from
communicating its judgments about “quality” in writing. In light of this, there can be no valid
basis to subject companies and their audit committees to a requirement to discuss, and possibly be
subject to, claims that they are responsible for, non-existent standards for financial statements.
This aspect of the Proposal, if adopted, can only have the effect of creating potential litigation and
liability, and discouraging qualified directors from serving on audit committees.

Accordingly, we urge that the words “the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the
acceptability, of” and the terms “clarity,” “representational faithfulness,” and “neutrality” be
deleted from proposed subsection .11 of SAS 61 (AU sec. 380.11). Finally, if the above changes
are made, the last three sentences of proposed subsection .11, dealing with the lack of objective
criteria and the prohibition on written communications, would appear unnecessary and can be
deleted.

2.

SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.

SAS 71 would be amended to require* the auditors to have the SAS 61 discussions (presently
required only for annual audits) in connection with a review of interim financials. Specifically,

a.

SAS 61 Discussion.
The auditor would have to communicate to the audit
committee, or be satisfied through discussions with the audit committee that
management communicated to the committee, matters described in SAS 61 that
have been identified in the conduct of the interim financial review.

We generally support the proposal requiring a discussion of SAS 61 information that has been
identified related to interim financial statements, but only if the content and extent of the SAS 61
information does not expand beyond the current Proposal modified in accordance with our
comments above, including elimination of the requirement to discuss the “quality” of accounting
principles.
We believe that such discussions can be helpful in ensuring that quarterly financial statements are
reliable and credible. Interim reviews also can relieve some of the burden and time pressure of the
year-end audit, as auditors will already be conversant with many of the significant issues expected
to arise on the year-end audit.

‘ Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information (May
1980).
* We note that SAS 71 as proposed to be amended appears to require auditor review prior to filing the Form 10-Q
(or 10-QSR). only if any SAS 61 items are identified. In other words, if the companychooses to have its auditors
do a SAS 61 review for the interim financial statements as well as the annual financials, then the auditors would
be required to attempt to have a SAS 71 discussion prior to filing the form 10-Q. However, if the SEC’s
companion proposals (Release No. 34-41987; October 7, 1999) are adopted as proposed, SEC-reporting
companies would be required to have the SAS 71 discussion/review prior to filing the Form 10-Q (or 10-QSB).
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Many of our larger corporate members already engage in SAS 61 type discussions with their
auditors in connection with their interim financial statements. For those companies, the proposed
SAS 71 requirement for interim SAS 61 discussions should not introduce any significant cost
increases or other burdens.
In addition, we understand that the major accounting firms are in most cases now requiring such
reviews as a condition to acceptance of new audit engagements. Thus, for many companies, the
proposal will not add significantly to the burden and expense of auditor reviews. For those
companies whose auditors do not now perform SAS 61-type reviews on interim financial
statements, it should be recognized that the requirement will add additional cost and delays in
release of interim financial statements.

In trying to devise a proposal that would provide the benefits of interim discussions without unduly
burdening those companies who presently do not have such a procedure, we believe the best
approach would be to defer the effectiveness of the proposed amendment to SAS 71 to interim
periods in fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2001. Earlier application should, of
course, be permitted and recommended. This would allow one year for the companies to develop
procedures, schedule audit committee meetings, establish internal review timetables, and make the
other necessary arrangements to implement the new requirements. In any event, the currently
proposed effective date would apply to first calendar quarter 2000 interim financial statements for
calendar year companies, a very tight time period under the best of circumstances. Finally, the
AICPA should consider an exemption or extended phase-in period for small businesses.

b.

The auditor would be required to
attempt to discuss the SAS 61 matters with the audit committee or at least the
committee chairperson, and a representative of financial management, prior to the
filing of the Form 10-Q and, if possible, prior to a public announcement of interim
financial results.
Timing of Interim Financial Review Discussions.

We support the principles that the independent auditor have timely access to the audit committee, or at
least the chair of the committee, and company financial management to discuss SAS 61 matters
identified with respect to interim financial statements prior to filing the Form 10-Q or 10-QSB. We
have some concerns, however, with the proposed amendment to SAS 71, particularly as it applies to
public announcements of interim results.
With respect to SAS 61 discussions prior to public announcement of results, we believe that some of
our larger company’s members already have such discussions. The new requirement would not impose
any significant burden or delay on them. With respect to other companies, the requirement could lead
to delays in earnings releases which work to the disadvantage of investors and create the conditions
under which inadvertent leaks may occur. While it is preferable to have the audit committee
discussions prior to release of earnings, it may not be practicable for some companies for a variety of
reasons. Among other things, many companies may not have their full financial statements completed
at the time they announce earnings. The Society proposes that the requirement regarding discussions
prior to public announcement be modified to be a recommended best practice, and that SAS 61 clarify
that companies are not required to delay the timing of their earnings releases or take on additional
burdens in order to have the discussion with the audit committee (or chair) prior to the release of
earnings.
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The Society appreciates this opportunity to comment on the Proposal. Please let us know if you have
any questions on our views.

Sincerely,

Margaret M. Foran
Chair
Securities Law Committee

Michael J. Holiday

Co-Chair
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force

Kathleen A. Weigand
Co-Chair
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force
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December 15, 1999

Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
National

Association

Re: File No. 2280; Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards,
Amendments to SAS Nos. 61 and 71

of

Dear Ms. Boothe:
Real Estate

Investment
Trusts®

The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) is pleased
to have the opportunity to respond to the AlCPA’s proposed Amendments to
Statements on Auditing Standards Nos. 61 and 71 (the Proposal). NAREIT is the
national trade association for REITs and publicly traded real estate companies.
Members include real estate investment trusts (REITs) and other businesses that
develop, own, operate, and finance income-producing real estate, as well as those
firms and individuals who advise, study, and service these businesses.

General Comments
NAREIT agrees with all of those involved in implementing the proposals of the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees (the BRC) that a vigilant and informed audit committee is essential to
ensure both investor protection and investor confidence. The Proposal suggests
certain amendments to SAS Nos. 61 and 71 in response to the BRC’s
recommendations and related proposals of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the major stock exchanges. Below are NAREIT’s specific
comments on the Proposal.

Comments Regarding Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61

Auditor’s Judgements About the Quality of a Company’s Accounting Principles
The Proposal would require that the auditor discuss with the audit committee the
auditor’s judgements about the quality, not just the acceptability, of an SEC
client’s accounting principles. The understandings of certain criteria, which may
be used in making these judgements, are relatively simple and clear. These
include consistency, clarity, completeness and verifiability. Other criteria such as
neutrality and representational faithfulness may not be clearly understood by
auditors, management or audit committee members. This represents a radical
change from previous practice.

♦ ♦ ♦
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For over fifty years, accounting professionals, including both financial managers and auditors,
have generally operated under the notion that accounting principles used by a company are
acceptable if they are consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP). In
addition, many believe that the U.S. capital markets are the most efficient in the world, in large
part because of the quality of U.S. financial reporting. We are concerned that, until a common
framework for assessing reporting quality is established by standard setters, conversations
between auditors and audit committees about the quality of acceptable accounting principles may
be confusing and dysfunctional.

Therefore, we urge the AICPA to delay the requirement for auditors to communicate their
judgements about the quality of a company’s accounting principles until a common framework
for assessing this quality is established and understood by management, auditors and audit
committee members. If this requirement for the auditor to discuss a client’s accounting
principles is included in a final standard, we would suggest that it only require the auditor to
discuss alternative accounting treatments in a neutral manner—not assessing the relative quality
of alternative principles.

Prohibition Against Written Auditor/Audit Committee Communication
The proposal prohibits auditors from communicating in writing the auditor’s judgements about
the quality of a company’s accounting principles. We believe that it is appropriate to base
conversations between auditors and audit committees on written communications.
Therefore, we suggest that the amendment to SAS No. 61 prohibit the use of “solely” written
communications. It should require discussions between auditors and audit committees “in
addition to” any written communications.
Comments Regarding Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 71
Although we support an SEC requirement that registrants engage their outside auditors to
conduct a SAS 71 review of interim financial information prior to the company’s filing of its
quarterly Form 10-Q, we do not support the Proposal’s requirement that the accountant of an
SEC client “attempt” to discuss with the audit committee the matters described in SAS No. 61
prior to filing or announcing interim information. Because of the time pressures involved with
quarterly reporting, we believe that this “attempt,” or even a phone conversation between
management, auditors and the audit committee chair, will devolve into a superficial review and
discussion. Worse, we are concerned that this superficial process will become a substitute for a
more substantive conversation between the auditor and the full audit committee regarding
interim financial reports. In addition, we are concerned about a standard containing the
vagueness of a notion of an auditor attempting to have discussions with audit committees.

Accordingly, we urge the AICPA to eliminate from its Proposal the requirement that an auditor
of an SEC client “attempt” to have discussions with the audit committee prior to the filing or
otherwise releasing interim financial information. We recommend that the standard require that
the auditor communicate appropriate findings from their SAS 61 review with the full audit
committee at its next subsequent meeting.
♦ ♦ ♦
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Conclusion
NAREIT fully supports the efforts of all parties to enhance the effectiveness of corporate audit
committees and thanks the AICPA for the opportunity to comment on its proposed amendments
to SAS Nos. 61 and 71. Please contact me at (484) 530-1888 or George Yungmann, NAREIT’s
Senior Advisor, Financial Standards, at (202) 739-9432 if you have any questions regarding this
letter.

Sincerely,

Timothy A. Peterson
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Keystone Property Trust
Co-Chair, NAREIT Accounting Committee

♦ ♦ ♦
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Meritor Automotive, Inc.
2135 West Maple Road
Troy, MI 48084-7186

MERITOR

November 24, 1999

Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609

Re:

Proposed Rule Changes - Audit Committees
File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 and File No. S7-22-99

Dear Mr. Katz:
Meritor Automotive, Inc. (“Meritor”) submits the following comments in the files
referenced above. Meritor’s Common Stock, $1 par value, is listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and registered under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Meritor files periodic reports and proxy
statements pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act.
File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 - Proposed Rule Change Amending Audit Committee
Requirements of Listed Companies

In response to recommendations issued in February 1999 by the Blue Ribbon Committee
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (the “Blue Ribbon
Committee”), The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (the “Exchange”) has proposed an
amendment to Section 303 of its Listed Company Manual. Section 303 contains audit
committee requirements applicable to companies with securities listed on the Exchange,
including Meritor. The amendment, in general terms, would require each audit
committee to have a written charter containing specified provisions; each audit
committee member to be independent, as defined, and financially literate; and at least one
audit committee member to have financial or accounting expertise.
Meritor supports the purposes and goals of the Blue Ribbon Committee’s
recommendations and the Exchange’s proposed amendment. We agree that standards
and guidelines for audit committees help to promote quality financial reporting and
constitute an essential part of good corporate governance. In particular, we believe that
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requirements with respect to independence and financial knowledge of audit committee
members are necessary and entirely appropriate. Meritor’s board of directors gave
substantial weight to these attributes in selecting the current members of its audit
committee.

However, we believe that one of the Exchange’s proposals (which corresponds with Blue
Ribbon Committee recommendation number 7) may be interpreted to impose additional
obligations and potential liabilities on audit committees. Meritor is concerned with the
proposed requirement that the audit committee’s written charter specify that the audit
committee is responsible for “ensuring” the independence of the company’s auditors. On
this subject, we concur with the position stated by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Meritor’s
independent auditor, in its comment letter submitted in this file on November 3, 1999.

We agree that the audit committee should review any relationships and transactions
between the company and its auditors that may affect their independence. The audit
committee should also be responsible for obtaining an independence letter from the
company’s auditors, in accordance with ISB Standard No. 1. However, in our view, the
burden of ensuring independence should fall on the auditors themselves and should not
be transferred to any other party in the audit process. We believe that the committee
should be entitled to reasonably rely on the representations and disclosures made by the
company’s auditors as to their independence, and should not be compelled to ensure that
those representations and disclosures are correct. We respectfully request that the final
wording of Section 303 of the Listed Company Manual be modified accordingly to
clarify that the audit committee’s role is to monitor or oversee the independence of the
outside auditor.
File No. S7-22-99 - Proposed Rule on Audit Committee Disclosure
In response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) also issued rule proposals that would require
certain disclosures on the functioning of audit committees of Exchange Act reporting
companies, including Meritor. The stated purpose of the proposed rules would be “to
promote investor confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process . . . ,”
among other things. Again, Meritor supports the Commission’s efforts in improving
disclosure in this area. However, we also have concerns with certain specific provisions
of the proposed rules.

1.

Negative Assurance - Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendation No. 9. The proposed
rules would require that a company’s proxy statement include a report of the audit
committee containing specified elements. Among other things the report would be
required to include a statement by the audit committee whether, based on its review
of the financial statements and discussions with management and the independent

auditors, anything has come to the committee’s attention that has caused it to believe
that the audited financial statements contain an untrue statement of material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
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circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The release proposing
the rule amendments also suggested various alternative forms of assurance and
requested comment on these alternatives.
The Commission noted in the proposing release that “[e]ffective oversight of the
financial reporting process is fundamental to preserving the integrity of our markets.
Audit committees can, and should, be the corporate participant best able to perform
that oversight function.” Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Committee recognized that the
audit committee’s role is “clearly one of oversight and monitoring.”

We agree that the audit committee’s role is to oversee and monitor the integrity of the
financial reporting process. We also believe that requiring the proposed assurances,
in any form, would expand the scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities beyond
the boundaries of oversight, and would require the committee to give “comfort” on
the substance of the financial statements. This role, we believe, is better left to the
accountants. Further, any such requirement could be a significant disincentive to
audit committee service, as a result of the potential for increased liability as well as
the increased workload. Accordingly, we respectfully suggest that this aspect of the
proposed rules not be adopted, in any form.

2.

Location of Information with respect to the Audit Committee - Blue Ribbon
Committee Recommendation No. 5. The Commission proposed that specific
information with respect to the audit committee be included in any proxy statement
relating to the election of directors and is seeking comments as to whether this would
be the appropriate place for the disclosure in question. We believe that it would be
more meaningful to include this information in proximity to the company’s audited
financial statements. As a result, we respectfully suggest that the required disclosure
be contained in the company’s Form 10-K or, alternatively, incorporated into the
Form 10-K from the Annual Report to Shareholders.

The proposed rules would also require that a company include a copy of the audit
committee charter as an appendix to the proxy statement at least once every three
years. We believe that this proposal, if adopted, would increase printing and mailing
costs in an amount that may be disproportionate to the level of investor interest, while
at the same time failing to provide interested investors with current information. We
respectfully suggest that the audit committee charter instead be filed as an exhibit to
the Form 10-K each year, with any interim amendment being filed as an exhibit to the
next Form 10-Q. In this manner, the audit committee charter would be readily
available to interested parties on the SEC’s website, or upon request to the company,
on a more current basis than that in the proposed rule, but at less expense to the
company. Alternatively, if the Commission ultimately determines that proxy
statement presentation is required, Meritor respectfully suggests that a summary of

the charter be included rather than appending the charter in its entirety.
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Meritor appreciates the opportunity to express its views on the proposed rules of the
Exchange and the Commission. If you have any questions with respect the foregoing,
you can contact the undersigned at 248/435-5504 or, in my absence, Vernon G. Baker, II,
at 248/435-0786, David W. Greenfield at 248/435-7708 or Bonnie Wilkinson at
248/435-0762.

Sincerely,

MERITOR AUTOMOTIVE, INC.

By:
Thomas A. Madden
Senior Vice President
And Chief Financial Officer

cc:

The New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Attention: Richard A Grasso, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Auditing Standards Board
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Attention: Deborah D. Lambert, Chair

Ira M. Millstein, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee
John C. Whitehead, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee

Meritor Automotive, Inc.
2135 West Maple Road
Troy, MI 48084-7186

MERITOR
November 26, 1999

Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609

Re:

Proposed Rule Changes - Audit Committees
File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 and File No. S7-22-99

Dear Mr. Katz:
The Audit Committee of Meritor Automotive, Inc. (“Meritor”) submits the following
comments in the files referenced above. Meritor’s Common Stock, $1 par value, is listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and registered under Section 12(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Meritor files periodic
reports and proxy statements pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act.

File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 - Proposed Rule Change Amending Audit Committee
Requirements of Listed Companies
In response to recommendations issued in February 1999 by the Blue Ribbon Committee
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (the “Blue Ribbon
Committee”), The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (the “Exchange”) has proposed an
amendment to Section 303 of its Listed Company Manual. Section 303 contains audit
committee requirements applicable to companies with securities listed on the Exchange,
including Meritor. The amendment, in general terms, would require each audit
committee to have a written charter containing specified provisions; each audit
committee member to be independent, as defined, and financially literate; and at least one
audit committee member to have financial or accounting expertise.

Meritor’s Audit Committee supports the purposes and goals of the Blue Ribbon
Committee’s recommendations and the Exchange’s proposed amendment. We agree that
standards and guidelines for audit committees help to promote quality financial reporting
and constitute an essential part of good corporate governance. In particular, we believe
that requirements with respect to independence and financial knowledge of audit
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committee members are necessary and entirely appropriate. Meritor’s Board of Directors
gave substantial weight to these attributes in selecting the current members of Meritor’s
Audit Committee.
However, we believe that one of the Exchange’s proposals (which corresponds with Blue
Ribbon Committee recommendation number 7) may be interpreted to impose additional
obligations and potential liabilities on audit committees. We are concerned with the
proposed requirement that the audit committee’s written charter specify that the audit
committee is responsible for “ensuring” the independence of the company’s auditors. On
this subject, we concur with the position stated by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Meritor’s
independent auditor, in its comment letter submitted in this file on November 3, 1999.

We agree that an audit committee should make inquiry regarding and review any
relationships and transactions between the company and its auditors that may affect their
independence. The audit committee should also be responsible for obtaining an
independence letter from the company’s auditors, in accordance with ISB Standard No. 1.
However, in our view, the burden of ensuring independence should fall on the auditors
themselves and should not be transferred to any other party in the audit process. We
believe that an audit committee should reasonably be entitled to rely on the
representations and disclosures made by the company’s auditors as to their independence,
and should not be compelled to ensure that those representations and disclosures are
correct. Taken to the extreme that litigious plaintiffs’ bar is readily capable of, this
requirement, if retained, could in effect cause audit committees to have to retain outside
experts to make an appropriate investigation and advise the committee as to whether the
independent auditors are in fact independent. We can readily see an entire new specialty
being created, at substantial and unnecessary expense, were this requirement to be
retained. We respectfully request that the final wording of Section 303 of the Listed
Company Manual be modified accordingly to clarify that the audit committee’s role is to
monitor or oversee the independence of the outside auditor.

File No. S7-22-99 - Proposed Rule on Audit Committee Disclosure
In response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) also issued rule proposals that would require
certain disclosures on the functioning of audit committees of Exchange Act reporting
companies, including Meritor. The stated purpose of the proposed rules would be “to
promote investor confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process ...,”
among other things. Again, Meritor’s Audit Committee supports the Commission’s
efforts in improving disclosure in this area. However, we also have concerns with
certain specific provisions of the proposed rules.
1. Negative Assurance - Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendation No. 9. The proposed
rules would require that a company’s proxy statement include a report of the audit
committee containing specified elements. Among other things the report would be
required to include a statement by the audit committee whether, based on its review
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of the financial statements and discussions with management and the independent
auditors, anything has come to the committee’s attention that has caused it to believe
that the audited financial statements contain an untrue statement of material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The release proposing
the rule amendments also suggested various alternative forms of assurance and
requested comment on these alternatives.

The Commission noted in the proposing release that “[ejffective oversight of the
financial reporting process is fundamental to preserving the integrity of our markets.
Audit committees can, and should, be the corporate participant best able to perform
that oversight function.” Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Committee recognized that the
audit committee’s role is “clearly one of oversight and monitoring.”
We agree that an audit committee’s role is to oversee and monitor the integrity of the
financial reporting process. We also believe that requiring the proposed assurances,
in any form, would expand the scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities beyond
the boundaries of oversight, and would require the committee to give “comfort” on
the substance of the financial statements. This role, we believe, is better left to the
accountants. Further, any such requirement could be a significant disincentive to
audit committee service, as a result of the potential for increased liability as well as
the increased workload. Again, we are mindful of the plaintiffs’ bar’s penchant for
frivolous litigation and see no substantive difference whether positive or negative
assurance be provided by the audit committee. A committee conscientious in
performing its duties would, were this requirement to be retained, have to consider
again retaining other accounting experts to help it review the work of the independent
auditors to see whether the committee responsibly could reasonably provide negative
(or positive) assurance. Accordingly, we respectfully suggest that this aspect of the
proposed rules not be adopted, in any form.

2. Location of Information with respect to the Audit Committee - Blue Ribbon
Committee Recommendation No. 5. The Commission proposed that specific
information with respect to the audit committee be included in any proxy statement
relating to the election of directors and is seeking comments as to whether this would
be the appropriate place for the disclosure in question. We believe that it would be
more meaningful to include this information in proximity to the company’s audited
financial statements. As a result, we respectfully suggest that the required disclosure
be contained in the company’s Form 10-K or, alternatively, incorporated into the
Form 10-K from the Annual Report to Shareholders.
The proposed rules would also require that a company include a copy of the audit
committee charter as an appendix to the proxy statement at least once every three
years. We believe that this proposal, if adopted, would not only increase printing and
mailing costs in an amount that may be disproportionate to the level of investor
interest, while at the same time failing to provide interested investors with current
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information, but also, and more importantly, would continue the ever increasing
amount of information required to be included in proxy statements, with the
unfortunate yet foreseeable result that fewer and fewer investors find the information
sufficiently useful to read proxy statements. We respectfully suggest that the audit
committee charter instead be filed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K each year, with any
interim amendment being filed as an exhibit to the next Form 10-Q. In this manner,
the audit committee charter would be readily available to interested parties on the
SEC’s website, or upon request to the company, on a more current basis than that in
the proposed rule, but at less expense to the company. Alternatively, if the
Commission ultimately determines that proxy statement presentation is required,
Meritor’s Audit Committee respectfully suggests that a summary of the charter be
included rather than appending the charter in its entirety.
We appreciate the opportunity to express our views on the proposed rules of the
Exchange and the Commission. If you have any questions with respect the foregoing,
you can contact the undersigned at 412/565-2059.

Sincerely,
MERITOR AUTOMOTIVE, INC.
AUDIT COMMITTEE

an

cc:

The New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Attention: Richard A Grasso, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer

Auditing Standards Board
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Attention: Deborah D. Lambert, Chair
Ira M. Millstein, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee

John C. Whitehead, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee
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Richard E. Staedtler
33 North Braintree Common
Langhorne, PA 19053

October 4, 1999

Mr. Ira Millstein
Senior Partner
c/o Paula Lowitt, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153-0119

Re: Audit Committee Issues
Dear Mr. Millstein:
I am the chief financial officer of Castle Energy Corporation (Nasdaq:CECX), a small public
company engaged in the business of exploration and production of oil and gas. I recently reviewed
the suggestions made by the Blue Ribbon Committee - especially those affecting the timely filing
of quarterly reports. Attached is a realistic comparison of the review requirements to file a Form
10-Q a year ago and those currently being proposed. The net effect of the proposed requirements
is that it will be virtually impossible to file on a timely basis because of the additional procedures
being contemplated. Even if all review procedures are completed as planned at least 51 days will
probably be required to file 10-Q, given the added review requirements. The inevitable result will
be that chief financial officers and controllers have to close the books based on estimates in order
to allow sufficient time for the multiple reviews being proposed. More reporting companies will
probably extend filing five days. The probability of mistakes resulting from using estimates or from
the time pressure caused by these new requirements is, in my opinion, greater than the probability
that the proposed multiple reviews will uncover mistakes.

In short, I urge you to reconsider your proposals. While some of these proposals appear
meritorious per se, it will become virtually impossible to meet the additional review requirements
being imposed and still to file on a timely basis. The combined burden resulting from not only all
of the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations but also other already existing burdens must be
considered rather than simply evaluating each recommendation alone.
As I reviewed the list of Blue Ribbon Committee members, I noticed that all members except
perhaps one were not financial officers who prepare quarterly statements. My guess is that none of
the committee members has been subject to the same requirements they seek to impose on others.
I hope this is an oversight and that the Blue Ribbon Committee will include several chief financial
officers or controllers who currently prepare financials and must work under the increasingly
stressful and unrealistic review requirements imposed on them.
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I also noticed that the Blue Ribbon Committee members included two senior executives of
large accounting firms. While I do not question their expertise in determining how long the firms
require to review and clear a Form 10-Q, I question their knowledge of the procedures and time
needed to compile and draft Form 10-Q. Auditors audit or review financial statements - they do not
and most have never prepared them. In addition, auditors benefit significantly from the new
procedures since additional fees will be charged for quarterly reviews. As a result, auditors have a
conflict of interest concerning many of the proposed recommendations. The argument that the
increased quarterly fees will be offset by a corresponding decreased annual fee is specious; whereas
some of the less costly audit procedures (procedural tests, tests of recorded balances, etc.) may be
reduced at year end, the costly parts of the review and audit - partner review, second partner review,
tax review, legal letters, management letters, checklists, etc. are repeated four times instead of once.
Expectation of no fee increase under such a scenario is quixotic at best.
While I do not dispute the Blue Ribbon Commission’s attempt to strengthen review procedures
for quarterly filings, I do believe that the proposed procedures, if implemented, would cause more
mistakes than they discover. While such procedures may be followed in filing Form 10-K within
90 days they cannot practically be followed in filing Form 10-Q within 45 days. One of the
justifications for the new proposed procedures is that such procedures will lessen the frequency of
amending quarterly earnings. I have no problem with the concept. The problem is that the good are
punished with the evil. Many justifying examples cited were audit failures - not failures to review.
Companies that have not restated quarterly earnings for the last five years should not be subjected
to mandatory quarterly review procedures.
I look forward to your response.

Sincerely yours,

RES/sp
cc:

Arthur Levitt, Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 5th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549

Richard A. Grasso
Chairman & CEO
New York Stock Exchange
Eleven Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
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Lynn E. Turner
Chief Accountant
Office of the Chief Accountant
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 5th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549

Frank G. Zarb
Chairman & CEO
NASDAQ
1735 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1500

Robert Bayless
Chief Accountant
Division of Corporate Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 5th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549

Blue Ribbon Committee on Audit
Committees
The Center for Board Leadership
1215 17th Street, NW, Suite 402
Washington, D.C. 20036

Financial Accounting Standards Board
401 Merritt 7
P.O. Box 5116
Norwalk, CT 06856-5116

The Honorable Arlen Specter
711 Hart Building
Washington, DC 20510

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: Audit Committee Relationship

The Honorable Rick Santorum
120 Russell Building
Washington, DC 20510

Public Oversight Board
One Station Place
Stamford, CT 06902
Joseph L. Castle II
Mary A. Cade
John P. Keller
Martin R. Hoffmann
Thomas G. Spencer, Esq.
Sidney F. Wentz
Robert S. Winter, Jr.

Comparison of Current and Proposed
Review Requirements

_Days Required After_
End of Each quarter
A Year
Ago

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

(1)

Obtain production information to close books (1)
Consolidate financials
Draft 10-Q (2)
Audit schedules (3)
Simultaneous review by management, legal counsel and
auditors (2)
Separate reviews:
Management and legal counsel
Auditors - first partner (4)
Auditors - second partner (5)
Audit Committee review (6)
Audit Committee and auditor review (6)
Edgarization
Total used
Extra (deficient) days
Total to file

34
2
2

Proposed

34
2
2
2

3
3
4
1

1
42
3
45

2
1
51
(6)
45

Most of Castle’s oil and gas well interests are non-operated. As a result, Castle is dependent
on timely production and revenue/expense data received from operators. Most of these data
are received 30-34 days after the month of production. Most operators, many of whom are not
public companies, are not required to provide the needed information for 30-34 days. Most
will not provide it sooner because they are also trying to run their monthly revenue and joint
interest billings. Hiring several people to call operators to obtain needed production
information 3-4 days earlier would probably fail because the operators are also busy preparing
their quarterly reports and would often not be able to respond and because there is no
obligation to do so. Furthermore, attempting to estimate non-operated data only 3-4 days
before such data are available makes no sense and because there is no obligation to do so.
As a result, one of the major effects of the proposed new requirements is that the financial
statements become estimates (since we cannot wait another 4-5 days, if we expect to file
timely).

(2)

Form 10-Q disclosure requirements have also increased significantly recently. Market risk,
Y2K, and prospective accounting principles disclosures have added at least 10% more work
to Form 10-Q.

Previously, management, legal counsel, and the auditors all reviewed a single draft
simultaneously. Because of the proposed proliferation of reviewers and the increased
probability of minor changes, each proposed reviewer, especially the auditors, will want the
final copy to review, i.e., they will want a draft reflecting the comments of all the other
reviewers. The resulting sequential reviews will literally involve most of my time for 6-10
days as each reviewer reviews not only the original draft 10-Q but also the other reviewers’
comments thereto. Furthermore, most reviewers have other jobs. Often they will not be
available on the earliest day I can get them a draft 10-Q or on the day that another reviewer
completes his review. The possibility of schedule conflicts becomes greater as more and more
reviewers are mandated. For example, the probability of having management, legal counsel
and a single partner from the audit firm available is much greater than the probability of having
management, the Audit Committee, legal counsel, and two partners (engagement partner and
second partner) from the audit firm available. The audit partners are typically involved in
multiple Form 10-Q reviews at quarter end - not just that of my company.

(3)

If an SAS #71 review is required, it will take at least two days to prepare the schedules
(rollforwards, analytical review, etc.) required by the auditors. Additional efforts will also be
needed to prepare legal letters and management representation letters for the auditors and to
follow up to make sure the legal letters are returned in 5-6 days - a period much shorter than
that demanded by most legal firms. If there is new litigation, a much longer response could
be required.

(4)

The audit review does not consist of one partner reviewing the 10-Q and related schedules.
Audit firms were hierarchical when I was at Price Waterhouse and they appear to remain so
today. Currently a staff or senior will typically foot and vouch schedules, a manager will
review the staff or senior’s work and conduct the review of more difficult areas and a partner
will review the draft 10-Q and related workpapers. If any accounting issues arise, second
partners, industry partners and national office partners may be consulted. If further explanation
or work is need, such tasks will typically be delegated - often down to the lowest private in the
chain of command. In short, all or most of the full chain of command is often used to conduct
the review. In addition, tax partners are often called upon to review tax implications. The net
result is that it is virtually impossible to accomplish a timely review when the complete chain
of command from private to general is involved despite the best of intentions. The SAS #71
review requirements being contemplated by the SEC will result in the mobilization of the
complete auditing chain of command when there is not sufficient time for such complete chain
of command. Delays will be inevitable given the number of auditors now involved in the
review and the related probability that each reviewer’s time schedule cannot be changed to
accommodate the 10-Q review procedures of any single company. Review will involve much
more than simply the review of a draft 10-Q by one firm partner or manager.

(5)

I believe most if not all auditors now require second partner reviews for Form 10-Q. This
often requires 1-2 more days as the second partner, often new to the account, frequently asks
historical questions requiring much background work. Often this involves review of
transactions and related accounting issues that occurred years ago. While there may be
sufficient time for such dual review at year end there is simply not sufficient time during the
clearance of quarterly financials.

(6) The Blue Ribbon Panel proposes that the auditor discuss each quarterly report with the Audit
Committee or the Chairman thereof and management. This is also time consuming because
a) it is unlikely that the Audit Committee can all meet when the auditors are ready and b) the
auditors and Audit Committee live far apart and are often unavailable due to other job
requirements. In addition, the Blue Ribbon Committee recommends that the Audit Committee
state whether it believes the financial statements are in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and expects the Audit Committee to be able to discuss the financial
statements on a level approaching that of the auditors. This requirement is naive. If the Audit
Committee wants to achieve this level of proficiency it will have to review the financial
statements and schedules to at least the same degree as the auditors. This would require days.
Many Audit Committee members do not want to conduct such a level of review nor should
they be required to do so if the auditors have done so. The Audit Committee’s main functions
do not include determination of generally accepted accounting principles and application
thereof. They assign this task to the experts - the auditors! The Audit Committee’s function
is to make sure a competent review is undertaken - not to conduct the review themselves. If
these recommendations are instituted, the result could be that the Audit Committee hires
additional auditors to determine for it whether generally accepted accounting principles have
been followed.

